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I.

INTRODUCTION

The class action mechanism is designed to harness the
plaintiffs' class action attorney's self-interest, typically framed as the
desire to maximize fees, to further the equitable goals of Rule 23
(e.g., enabling litigation that would not be economically viable
absent certification).' In a series of influential articles over the past
several decades, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. identified a problem

1. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.,
109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working,
42 MD. L. REv. 215, 220 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney
General] ("In theory, the private attorney general is induced by the profit motive to
seek out cases that otherwise might go undetected."); William B. Rubenstein, On
What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv.
2129, 2136-37 (2004) [hereinafter Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney
General" Is] (describing the emergence of a fee-driven concept of the private
attorney general).
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Professor Coffee used agency cost theory3 to

2. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities
Class Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better Than "Voice", 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407,
408 (2009) [hereinafter Coffee, Accountability and Competition] ("[T]his benefit
[of class action litigation] comes at the cost of creating principal agent problems
that remain intractable despite repeated efforts by Congress and the courts to curb
highly visible abuses."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Torts Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1349 (1995) [hereinafter
Coffee, Class Wars] ("Although agency costs are inevitably high in all class
actions, the mass tort class action is uniquely vulnerable to the danger of collusion,
and thus needs special safeguards."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance:
Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296 (2010) [hereinafter
Coffee, Litigation Governance] ("In particular, this Essay will focus on the
concept of 'agency costs' and the tradeoffs between exit and voice as tools by
which to regulate the behavior of agents in aggregate litigation."); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882-83 (1987)
[hereinafter, Coffee, EntrepreneurialLitigation] ("High agency costs characterize
class action litigation and permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys. As a result,
it is more accurate to describe the plaintiffs attorney as an independent
entrepreneur than an agent of the client."); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General, supra note 1, at 229 ("Put simply, the hallmark of the private attorney
general is that as a practical matter he is unconstrained by the dictates or interests
of a specific client."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy
Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L. J. 625, 628 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking
the Class Action] ("It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest can arise in
class action litigation between attorney and client."); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintif'sAttorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement ofLaw Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 669, 671-72 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney] ("[C]onflicts . . . arise between the interests of these attorneys and their
clients in class and derivative actions . . . ."); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful

Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11-12 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion]
("[W]e are at the stage where the real need is not for more, inherently ambiguous
empirical data, but instead for a clear model by which to predict how changes in
legal rules enhance or reduce the ability of private enforcement to reduce agency
costs.").
3. Agency theory is concerned with problems that arise in agency
relationships when the principal and agent have different risk-preferences and
goals, and it is difficult or costly for the principal to monitor the agent. See
generally Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14
AcAD. OF MGMT. REv. 57, 58-59 (1989) (discussing agency theory and its
applicability in a variety of contexts). See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12
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demonstrate that class members' inability or unwillingness to
monitor class counsel gives the plaintiffs' attorney license to pursue
his own interests without effective restraint. That, then, begged
important subsidiary questions: what does class counsel want, and
how does he achieve it? The answers to these questions inform our
understanding of the nature of agency costs in class litigation and of
how we should manage such costs. Professor Coffee provided one
answer, by way of illustration, imagining class counsel as a solo
practitioner or small law firm, cohesive in its desire to maximize law
firm profit and capable of pursuing that one overriding interest by
pegging case investment to expected fees. 4 This understanding of
the plaintiffs' class action attorney gained currency in the 1980s and
became conventional; 5 however, there is little consensus regarding

(1991) (noting that agency theory stems from the work of, among others, Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) [hereinafter Theory of
the Firm]). "Agency costs" are the sum of monitoring expenditures by the
principal, bonding expenditures by the agent, and the loss in welfare experienced
by the principal due to the "divergence between the agent's decisions and those
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal." Id. at 308.
4. See e.g., Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney, supra note 2, at
712 ("In effect, such attorneys may restrict their investment of time and money in
any individual case just as intelligent speculators may adopt self-imposed trading
rules that limit their investment in any one stock.").
5. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 801-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing the trial court's order certifying a
settlement class; finding representation to be inadequate; and noting that "[s]ome
commentators blame the system of compensating class action lawyers in a manner
that fails to confront fully the differences between class action litigation and
classical bipolar litigation for creating incentives that diverge markedly and
predictably from their clients' interests") (citing as the leading critic on this issue,
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 2, at 671-72); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 953-54 (Tex. 1996) (finding that the
class notice inadequately disclosed fee provisions of the proposed class settlement;
noting the growing concern expressed regarding conflicts between class lawyers
and their clients; and citing, among others, Coffee, Rethinking the Class
Action, supra note 2, at 628-29, who listed "several factors that have contributed
to entrepreneurial class action litigation, including the relatively low cost of filing
dubious class action suits, the large amounts defendants are willing to pay in
settling these suits, and the incentive for class counsel to invest little time and
effort in protecting absent class members"); Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 7-8
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the solution to the agency cost problem the conventional
understanding defines. 6
This paper introduces a new perspective to the literature,
namely that the conventional account of the plaintiffs' class action
attorney that was developed in Professor Coffee's early work nearly
a quarter of a century ago reflects a different practice regime than
It thus does not correctly identify class counsel's
today's.
characteristics, interests, or capabilities. Specifically, there is no one
entrepreneurial lawyer at the heart of class litigation. Instead, there
are varieties of lawyers and law firms working on different types of
cases, each combination of which produces a distinct array of
incentives. Moreover, class counsel invest time in cases for complex
reasons other than the effect on expected fees, which are exceedingly
difficult to predict. The goal of this Article is to add depth and
complexity to our understanding of plaintiffs' class counsel to enable
a clearer assessment of and more tailored responses to
principal-agent problems in class actions.
Part II of this Article outlines the conventional understanding
of the plaintiffs' class action lawyer. Part III explores how variations
in law firm size and internal architecture 7 affect individual attorney
incentives, and thus provide a new basis for modeling plaintiffs'
class counsel. Specifically, Part III identifies the organizational
features of firms that are most likely to fit the conventional account
of fee-maximizing class counsel, and it juxtaposes that list of
features against a new model of plaintiffs' class counsel. This new
model describes the internal structure of the dominant plaintiffs'
firms today and explains their relative lack of cohesion in pursuit of
law firm profit. Part III also calls into question the emphasis that has
(describing how attorneys in these cases act "largely according to their own self
interest").
6. See infra notes 31-34 (identifying, by way of example, disparate
solutions to the agency cost problem Professor Coffee framed).
7. "Organizational architecture" includes key features of firm design,
including, among others, "the assignment of decision-making authority, the reward
system, and the performance-evaluation system." JAMES A. BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD
W.

SMITH

&

JEROLD

L.

ZIMMERMAN,

MANAGERIAL

ECONOMICS

AND

ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE VI, 5 (5th ed. 2009) (examining the variation in

law firm size and attorney incentives). See also infra note 68 (explaining
organizational architecture's importance as a reference point in organizational
theory and organizational economics).
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been placed on expected fees as the driver of attorney caseinvestment decisions. Part IV explores the implications of this
inquiry: a more complete account of class counsel reveals new
opportunities for empirical research, identifies new levers with
which to possibly better align class counsel's and class members'
(actual) interests, and provides new impetus in support of direct
regulation of class action outcomes at the time courts evaluate
proposed settlements.

II.

THE CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAINTIFFS'
CLASS ACTION ATTORNEY

There is a popular perception of plaintiffs' class action
lawyers that is not rooted in a particular model, and is, instead, an
intuition: they are greedy.8 Anecdotal reports of bad settlements
receive a great deal of attention and are referenced as proof of class
counsel's essential character flaw. 9 But without a model to define
8. See Editorial, Going After Wal-Mart, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, April
1, 2011, at A12 ("If there was ever such a thing as junk justice, the suit against
Wal-Mart now in the Supreme Court is exhibit A. By claiming that evidence is no
longer needed to prove discrimination, what's proven is the greed of lawyers.");
Peter Bronson, Don Corleone Would Tip His Fedorato the Fen-Phen Class Action
Lawyers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 22, 2008, at 3D ("Yes, it happens all the
time . . .. Greedy class-action lawyers shake down corporations, often on flimsy

evidence."); Susan Milligan, Senate Battles Put Democratic Pair on the Spot,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2004, at Al (noting, in regard to the then-proposed Class

Action Fairness Act (CAFA) (eventually enacted as Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(2005) (codified in various sections of Title 28 of the United States Code)), that
backers of the bill asserted it would restrain "greedy lawyers who make millions
suing businesses on what they view as questionable grounds").
9. One of the most notorious settlements involved claims against Bank of
Boston Corporation, relating to its alleged practices of posting interest to escrow
accounts. Those claims were settled in an Alabama state court in such a way as to
generate an $8 million fee for class counsel, while leaving some class members
actually owing money (to pay the fee award). See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston
Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting)
(describing the settlement terms and arguing for rehearing en banc). See also
Jennifer Brooks, Consumers Caught in Drive to Rein in Class Action Lawsuits,
GANNETT NEWS

SERVICE, Feb.

16, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No.

GNS0000020050218el2g00001 (discussing arguments floated in favor of the
Class Action Fairness Act; listing a number of settlements that appeared to pay
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the parameters of class counsel's greed, the problem has no
boundaries; nor does the solution. That is, we have no way of
knowing whether the problem is structural (and, if so, its contours
and remedy), or, alternatively, whether the occasional bad egg is at
fault (and, if so, how to identify and restrain bad eggs). This Article
addresses this popular intuition about class counsel only indirectly.
My primary subject is what I have alternatively termed the
"conventional understanding" or "conventional account" of the
plaintiffs' class action attorney, one which presents a more
systematic and, thus, more damning critique of the class action
plaintiffs' bar.
In a series of articles, Professor Coffee provided an
authoritative account of the plaintiffs' class action attorney,to one
grounded in agency cost theory." There are two related aspects of
this account. First, in the broadest possible terms, Professor Coffee's
contribution was to recognize that principal-agent problems may be
particularly acute in class actions because class members have little
large fees while leaving class members with little or nothing of value; and
specifically discussing the Bank of Boston settlement); Sherman Joyce, Class
Action Clients Often Fleeced by Greedy and Unscrupulous Lawyers, KNIGHT
RIDDER/TRIBUNE, May 5, 1998 (discussing the Bank of Boston and other unfair

class action settlements); David Wessel, Class Action Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar.
24, 2005, at A2 (discussing the Bank of Boston settlement).
10. See supra note 2 (identifying representative articles by Professor Coffee).
11. Professor Coffee's attraction to the agency lens is not surprising; as an
expert in corporate law, where principal-agent problems are deemed central, he
was nicely positioned to see the parallels between class counsel and corporate
officers, as agents, and class members and shareholders, as principals. See AM.
LAW

INST.,

PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE,

"Analysis

and

Recommendations," pt. VII ch. 1 Intro. Note, 14 (2008) ("a central concept in
modem institutional economics is that of 'agency cost'); BRENT A. OLSON,
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REGULATION § 2:3 (3d ed.
2011) (noting that "the current structure of laws governing publicly held
corporations establishes the respective roles of shareholders, directors, and officers
so as to balance these twin objectives of flexibility and accountability. In defining
these respective roles, corporate law seeks to minimize the 'agency costs' resulting
from the separation of ownership and control"); Charles Silver, Class ActionsRepresentative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. & ECON. 194, 199

(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("[I]t is useful to think of
classes as litigation groups in which ownership and control of assets are in
different hands .

. .

. In this respect, classes resemble stock companies

which investors play relatively passive roles." (citations omitted)).

. . .

in
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incentive or ability to restrain their agent, class counsel, who is thus
able to pursue his own interests, even at the expense of the class
members' interests.12 What are those interests, and how do they
diverge? The answer to that subset of questions is particularly
important, both to measure and manage agency costs. This brings us
to the second aspect of Professor Coffee's account, which this
Article seeks to update and revise. In his early writings, Professor
Coffee illustrated how agency costs manifest in class litigation by
relying upon three core clusters of simplifying assumptions.
First, class counsel is either a sole practitioner ("the
plaintiffs attorney," singular),13 or a cohesive group, such as a small
firm,14 without internal structural complexity, such that the interests
of the attorneys and the firm are indistinguishable.
Second, behaving as a rational decision-maker who acts
"according to the same utility-maximizing criteria as do other
businessmen,"' 5 the entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorney's paramount
interest is the pursuit of his own profit, which is, as noted,
indistinguishable from his firm's profit. Even if class counsel seeks
to maximize profits, it is not immediately obvious why his interests
12. See Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 2, at 685
(noting that a "serious" principal-agent problem is "likely" in class actions "where
the number of clients is large and the individual injuries [are] small").
13. See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintif'sAttorney, supra note 2, at
676 (describing the plaintiffs attorney as an individual entrepreneur); Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 2, at 12 (repeatedly referring to the plaintiffs
attorney as a singular individual).
14. Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney, supra note 2, at 706 n.102
(noting the small size of plaintiffs' firms but omitting consideration of firm
structure's effects on attorney incentives).
15. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra note 2, at 12 ("The claim that we
should view the plaintiffs attorney as a risk-taking entrepreneur will seem
offensive to some and must be explained in greater detail . .

.

. It assumes neither

that we should tolerate substantial conflicts of interest between the attorney and the
class he represents, nor that all attorneys will act in a purely self-interested fashion.
Rather, the only assumption underlying this perspective is that economic
incentives will have a marginal impact upon the behavior of private enforcers and
that therefore the law should seek to fashion the incentives that it holds out so as to
align better the interests of the plaintiffs attorney with those of his clients.").
Professor Coffee has also described the plaintiffs attorney as a "utilitymaximizing entrepreneur who manages a portfolio of actions and thus makes
litigation decisions in an individual case based upon their overall impact on the
portfolio." Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney, supra note 2, at 677.
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would not be aligned with those of the class; typically class counsel
is paid a percentage of the class's return, so for every new dollar the
class makes, class counsel should continue to make his percentage
and hence to push for that next dollar. But, Professor Coffee
explained, class counsel and the class have asymmetric litigation
stakes: class counsel bears the expenses of litigation, yet it turns out
that his fee is a declining percentage of the fund, such that he always
has more at stake, and more to lose, than do class members.'1 For
these reasons, class counsel is willing to invest less in the litigation
than the clients would want and, moreover, is tempted to settle
prematurely and sub-optimally.' 8
Third, class counsel not only has the opportunity, but also has
the capacity to pursue his own interests, so defined.19 That is, he can
ably modulate his case-investment and settlement decisions to
maximize his law firm profit. To do that on a marginal basis, he
must have a meaningfully definite estimate of the relationships
among additional investment (e.g., additional hours spent litigating),
the effect of that investment on case value (the likely outcome by
litigation or settlement, and the resulting fee), and his opportunity
costs (e.g., what he would earn by investing the same additional
increment of time in another matter). In sum, what I refer to in this
Article as the conventional understanding of class counsel imagines
him as small, cohesively interested in firm profit, and capable of
pursuing that overriding interest at the expense of the class.
Those three clusters of assumptions give content to the
Professor
agency cost problem Professor Coffee identified.
in
the
manner
graphically
illustrated
Coffee
16. Coffee, Accountability and Competition, supra note 2, at 413-14.
17. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 2, at 685
("[L]itigation must be viewed as a continuing investment decision, and plaintiffs
attorneys have reason to be more hesitant to invest in an action than do their
clients.").
18. Coffee, Accountability and Competition, supranote 2, at 412-13 ("Absent
client control, the plaintiffs attorney will predictably deviate from the clients'
preferences to pursue the attorney's own interests .

.

.. In the simplest and most

extreme case, the plaintiffs attorney might exchange a cheap (or below-market)
settlement for a lucrative (and above-market) attorney's fee . . . ." (emphasis in

original)); Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 2, at 687-90
("[P]laintiff s attorneys have an incentive to settle prematurely and cheaply when
they are compensated on the traditional percentage of the recovery basis.").
19. Id.
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which agency costs may manifest in class litigation, using additional assumptions borrowed from a 1978 article by Kevin
21
Clermont and John Currivan, 20 as set forth in Figure A.

20. Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent
Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 537-46 (1978). This classic article is not specific
to class actions; it addresses contingency fees in general. Its illustration of
divergent interests takes on particular importance in the class setting, given the
monitoring problems in class litigation that Professor Coffee highlighted. See
supra note 2 (describing Professor Coffee's long work on the monitoring
problem).
21. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 2, at 689.
Coffee has used the same chart on more than one occasion to illustrate attorney
See Coffee, The Unfaithful
marginal investment and settlement decisions.
Champion, supra note 2, at 42 (using the same chart).
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In Figure A, the "s-curve" represents the settlement amount,
on the assumption that settlement is assured and increases in size as a
direct function of the attorney's time, "until a point is reached where
further efforts produce little or no return." 2 Assuming that the
plaintiffs' attorney will be compensated on a percentage basis, the
"f-curve" represents the expected attorney's fee, which is a

22. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff'sAttorney, supranote 2, at 688.
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The "o-line"
predictable function of the settlement's size. 23
represents the attorney's opportunity costs, which are assumed to
increase at a constant rate over the period of case investment in
proportion to the aggregate time invested by class counsel. 24 The
client's interest is in a settlement at point X, which is the point of
greatest distance between the settlement and fee curves; at that point,
the clients' net recovery--the difference between the settlement and
the fee-is maximized, which occurs, in Figure A, at that particular
number of hours where the tangents to the s-curve and the f-curve
become parallel.2 5 Whereas, it is in the attorney's interest to settle
much earlier at point Y, which is the point of greatest distance
between the fee curve and the line representing attorney opportunity
costs, after which point the o-line rises more rapidly than the f-curve,
so the lawyer's opportunity cost (i.e., the amount he would earn
investing the additional hour on another matter) exceeds the
26
The attorney's expected return is
corresponding fee increase.
maximized at a much earlier point in the litigation investment
continuum than is the client's.27 Given Professor Coffee's vision of
class counsel as a profit-maximizing economic actor, who is
distinctly unconstrained by a capable or interested client, class
counsel will predictably invest too little (only up to point Y) in class
23. Id.
24. Id. It is assumed that the plaintiffs' attorney "has no idle time and each
hour he devotes to the plaintiffs case he would otherwise have devoted to matters
handled at his certain hourly wage-i.e., time that the lawyer allocates to the
plaintiffs case causes him to forgo earning his certain hourly wage." Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 20, at 538. See also Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney, supra note 2, at 688 (describing the assumption that each hour spent on
the case is a forgone opportunity for other involvement). Plaintiffs' counsel's
"interests suggest that he should continue to devote hours to this case only as long
as each additional hour increases his fee by at least as much as his opportunity
cost. When the hourly increase in his fee drops below his opportunity cost, he
would do better to settle and then to shift his efforts to other matters." Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 20, at 545.
25. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 20, at 543.
26. Id. at 545-46.
27. Point Z-the point of greatest distance between the attorney's opportunity
costs and the settlement amount-represents the socially optimal settlement point,
assuming that only the client and the lawyer have an interest in the action, because
any further marginal investment of costs will be greater than the marginal increase
in settlement size at that point. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney,
supra note 2, at 688-90.
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action litigation. 28
Professor Coffee's writings are, of course, more nuanced than
this short summary of decades of his work product suggests. But the
basic understanding of class counsel described in his writings, and
distilled above, has remained one of his most consistent themes.
A few commentators have raised doubts about the
conventional understanding of class counsel, adding new features, 29
or questioning its significance. 30 But in general, the account is
28. It can be argued that Professor Coffee never intended Figure A to be
taken literally. It is, the argument goes, designed merely as a visual aid, to enable
"us to see how the interests of client and attorney diverge."
Coffee,
Understandingthe Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 2, at 688. But for Figure A to
map anything, it has to at least represent quantities that can be sufficiently
ascertained to be placed in relation to each other, and to meaningfully guide
attorney decision-making. There are two main types of principal-agent problems
in class litigation, a typology of which may be useful at this juncture: Professor
Coffee's illustration of agency costs in Figure A, above, describes one common
principal-agent problem, which I label "shirking," where class counsel invests less
time in class litigation than class members would prefer, and settles prematurely.
Although Figure A does not map it, Professor Coffee's more general description of
agency costs in class litigation also encompasses another problem, where class
counsel, regardless of the amount of time invested in a case, "sells out" the class
during settlement discussions, by for example trading class member settlement
benefits in exchange for attorneys' fees. The two types of principal-agent
problems overlap; "shirking" is arguably a particular instance of the broader "sellout" phenomenon. The presentation in Part III, below, of a new model of
plaintiffs' class action attorneys that acknowledges the effects of intra-firm
structure on individual attorney incentives is equally relevant to both shirking in
particular and to the "sell out" problem writ large, to the extent some lawyers,
within some firm structures, are driven by incentives other than maximizing fees.
However, the discussion, below, of the difficulty class counsel has pegging case
investment to expected fees pertains specifically to shirking.
29. See Rubenstein, On What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is, supra note 1,
at 2137 (supplementing the conventional account of the entrepreneurial lawyer by
devising a new taxonomy of types of "private attorneys general," organized around
the extent of publicness or privateness involved, rather than around the sole axis of
attorney incentives); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement?: Longshot
Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 567, 589-93 (2000)
(suggesting that Coffee's account may be insufficient to explain the large
percentage of low-dollar settlements).
30. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 103, 104-06 (2006) (arguing that class counsel, in the limited context of
negative value suits, should be forgiven for pursuing his own interest in fees at the
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unchallenged. Professor Coffee is repeatedly cited in support of
schemes to- restrain class counsel by, among other things:
manipulating the selection, payment, and/or monitoring of class
counsel;31 inserting more adversarialism into or otherwise enhancing
the effectiveness of the settlement-approval process;32 facilitating

expense of payments to class members, on the ground that deterrence, not
compensation, is the primary goal of such suits).
31. See Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and
Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 71-72 (2004)
(proposing as a solution to the agency cost problem in class actions a compulsory
auction mechanism for appointing counsel and for awarding fees, designed to
reduce both shirking and collusion); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation
in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1997) (examining
judicial regulation of class counsel's fees as a means of addressing acute
principal-agent issues in class action litigation); Alon Klement, Who Should
Guardthe Guardians?A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21
REV. LITIG. 25, 61-80 (2002) (recommending the use of independent private
monitors to select, supervise, and pay class counsel, subject to court approval; the
monitor would be appointed pursuant to an auction and would be paid a percentage
of the total class recovery); Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 6 ("We draw on the
economic theory of agency costs to suggest that the special problems of
entrepreneurial litigation could be substantially overcome if the legal system were
to allow some form of auction for plaintiffs' claims, under which attorneys (and
others) could bid for the right to bring the litigation and gain the benefits, if any,
that flow from success. A pure form of auction would simply sell the plaintiffs'
claim outright to the winning bidder, with the proceeds to be distributed
immediately to the class or corporation."); Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring:How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2105-09 (1995) (proposing
reforms that eventually inspired the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of Chapters 15 and 18
of the United States Code)), including the creation of "a procedural environment
that facilitates service by institutional investors as lead plaintiffs," such as a
presumption that the named plaintiff or group of plaintiffs with the largest
financial stake in the outcome, and thus the greatest incentive to monitor class
counsel, is adequate to represent the class).
32. See J. Brendan Day, Comment, My Lawyer Went to Court and All I Got
Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action FairnessAct's Inadequate Provision
for JudicialScrutiny over ProposedCoupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1085, 1121-26 (2008) (suggesting a rebuttable presumption against all coupon
settlements as one solution to the agency problem); William B. Rubenstein, The
Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1435, 1438-39 (2006) [hereinafter Rubenstein, The FairnessHearing] (proposing,
among other fixes to the principal-agent problem in class actions, use of a court-
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class member participation; 3 3 and increasing the scope of potential
liability for plaintiffs' lawyers. 34 Three things are particularly
noteworthy about these proposals. First, many of the proposed
solutions that have actually been adopted involve market- or
incentive-based efforts to, ex ante, align the perceived interests of
Second, these reforms are
class counsel and class members.
35
perceived either as having had mixed results (e.g., auctions), or as
having failed to solve the agency cost problem in class action
litigation (e.g., moving from a lodestar3 6 approach to calculating
appointed "devil's advocate" during settlement evaluation to argue against
approval of the settlement).
33. See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: ExtortionistFree Riders or
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 407 (considering expanded
participation by settlement objectors as one remedy for the monitoring problems
that plague class actions); Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71,
125-33 (2007) (suggesting both increased communication between the trial court
and the class and elimination of the presumption that the absence of objections
from class members necessarily implies support for proposed settlements).
34. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1056-57 (1996) (proposing civil and criminal
penalties for class counsel who act contrary to the interests of the class during
settlement negotiations).
35. See Edward R. Becker, C.J., The Third Circuit Task Force Report on
Selection of Class Counsel, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 696, 740 (2001) [hereinafter
Becker, Third Circuit Task Force] (noting that the "goal of all the procedures
surrounding the appointment of class counsel and the setting of fees is to establish
appropriate structures and monitoring mechanisms to substitute for the ordinary
attorney-client relationship and to assure performance of the fiduciary
responsibilities owed by both the lawyer and the lead plaintiff to the class" and
expressing skepticism about auctions because the "class recovery generally can be
maximized more effectively by using the traditional methods of appointing
counsel: private ordering where that is possible, court selection on the basis of
quality of counsel if private ordering is not workable, and court control over the
fee award in all cases"); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 96 (2001) (criticizing the use of auctions in securities class
actions).
36. Under the "lodestar" formula for calculating attorney's fees, fee awards
are primarily the product of the number of hours reasonably expended in an action
and the attorney's billing rate, adjusted if appropriate by a multiplier to account for
risk and quality of work. See Becker, Third Circuit Task Force,supra note 35, at
706 ("The lodestar method requires a calculation of the hours spent in conducting
the litigation, multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate, and adjusted, if appropriate,
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attorney's fees to a percentage of fund methodology, 37 or promoting
the appointment of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions).38 Third, though the class action mechanism
by a multiplier factor for quality and risk."); Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff's
Attorney, supra note 2, at 675 n.16 (explaining key decisions adopting the lodestar
formula as specified in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION). The percentage
of fund method for calculating attorney's fees gives the attorney "a portion of the
fund that his efforts have 'salvaged,"' by multiplying the fund created by the
attorney's efforts by a percentage, the benchmark for which usually declines as the
size of the fund increases, and which some jurisdictions still cross check against
lodestar to assess reasonableness. Id. at 678-79 n.26. See also Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 49 (2004) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Miller, Attorney Fees] (noting that fees awarded in common fund
cases are now often calculated using the percentage of fund methodology).
37. See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 2, at 292 (asserting that
principal-agent problems in the class setting "remain intractable despite repeated
efforts by Congress and the courts to curb highly visible abuses"); Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 2, at 48 (finding the percentage of fund
methodology "less imperfect" than the lodestar approach at aligning the interests
of class counsel and class members); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda,
Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1699 (2008) ("One
widely shared insight in the literature is that even fee-calculation methods that
reward class counsel for additional increments of settlement value obtained for the
class-as does the dominant method, which casts the fee award in terms of a
percentage of the common fund recovered for the class-still do not perfectly align
the incentives of class counsel with those of class members.").
38. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its
Lawyers: Changes Duringthe FirstDecade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1489, 1489-90 (2006) [hereinafter Choi & Thompson, SecuritiesLitigation and Its
Lawyers] (finding "substantial continuity in the plaintiffs' bar in securities class
actions; the legislation did not dislodge the dominant plaintiff law firms nor did it
encourage substantial new entrants"); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana
Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in
Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1636 (2006) (finding that lead
plaintiffs who are institutional investors do add value, but perhaps they add less
value to securities litigation than was expected by the architects of the PSLRA's
lead plaintiff provision and appear less often than had been hoped: "Our real
concern about institutions is that they do not seem to be able to increase dollar
recoveries at the same pace as Provable Losses. This is disappointing and facially
inconsistent with institutional lead plaintiffs' beliefs that they can double or triple
recoveries overall."). Cf James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There
Are Plaintiffs and. . . There Are Plaintiffs: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Securities
Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 385 (2008) ("The lead plaintiff
provision sought to attract institutions and others who have a significant stake in
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continues to generate anxiety, as evidenced by the richness of the
reform literature it inspires, there is no consensus on how best to
further reduce agency costs. Acknowledging the complexity that the
conventional understanding of class counsel obscures provides new
insight and direction.

III.

WHY THE CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING FAILS AND THE
NEW MODEL THAT REPLACES IT

The conventional understanding of plaintiffs' class counsel
assumes the existence of a uni-dimensional plaintiffs' attorney: a
small firm, without internal complexity, that cohesively and capably
seeks to maximize law firm profit. However, the leading class action
firms today are relatively large. The trend to large-firm dominance
of the class action bar is well-known to modern observers, though
the effect of firm size on the incentives of individual class action
attorneys, discussed below, has not been fully appreciated. Large
firms possess internal structural complexity that creates diverse
incentives other than law firm profit. And they make caseinvestment decisions by reference to complex factors not considered
in the conventional account. Acknowledging this complexity creates
opportunities to construct a new model of plaintiffs' class action
attorneys, and thus to more precisely map and address agency costs.
A.

The Plaintiffs' Class Action Bar Is Highly Stratified;
the Leading Firms Are Relatively Large

The small firm has historically been characterized by fewer
than ten attorneys. 39 Such firms are more likely to adopt forms of
the litigation to become the suit's plaintiff. Our findings not only reflect that
nearly eighteen percent of securities class actions settlements in suits initiated after
the PSLRA are prosecuted by institutional plaintiffs of the type desired by
Congress, but also, more importantly, that they add substantial value to the
outcome.").
39. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large
Law Firms: A ComparativePerspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 593, 596 (2002) ("While
the vast majority of American lawyers continued to practice as solos or in very
small firms until the 1950s, the traditional pattern held even greater sway abroad.
Until quite recently, firms with more than a handful of lawyers remained
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organization that tend to enhance cohesion. When Professor Coffee
first popularized the use of agency cost theory in the class setting, he
described a landscape dotted with small plaintiffs' firms, which he
predicted would remain static, in terms of size, due to various
constraints.4 0 But larger firms have in fact come to dominate the
plaintiffs' class action bar. 4 1 For example, a few large plaintiffs'
firms are present in most securities class action lawsuits. 42 Many of
the largest plaintiffs' firms in this field are also the busiest: 43
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd (formerly known as Coughlin,
Stoia, Gellar, Rudman & Robbins), with 180 attorneys in eight
offices nationwide, 44 served as lead or co-lead counsel on an
estimated 30% of all securities class action settlements in 2009uncommon in England and virtually non-existent on the Continent and in Latin
America, India, and Japan. The large law firm is an American invention and
export."); id. at 597 (identifying ten as a number below which a firm should be
considered "small," based on the likelihood that firms with more than ten attorneys
are more likely to adopt "bureaucratic" internal structures); Richard H. Sander &
E. Douglass Williams, A Little Theorizing About the Big Law Firm: Galanter,
Palay, and the Economics of Growth, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 391, 391 (1992)
("A century ago, no law firm outside of New York City had as many as 7
attorneys.").
40. Coffee, Understandingthe PlaintiffsAttorney, supra note 2, at 706-11.
41. See Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators
of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First
Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 219, 230-32 (2001) (describing how larger firms
tend to handle the larger class action cases and identifying leading firms based on
reputation, firm size, and the size of the cases the firms tackle). The leading
plaintiffs' firms today are generally larger than they were two decades ago, even if
they are still smaller than the large mega-firms that have, in the same period,
dominated corporate defense practice. See Brian Cheffins, John Armour &
Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the
Plaintiffs' Bar, 2012 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 427, 456 (2012) [hereinafter Cheffins,
Armour & Black, Delaware CorporateLitigation] (explaining that plaintiffs' firms
are smaller than large corporate defense firms).
42. See Coffee, Accountability and Competition, supra note 2, at 442 (noting
that "[a]s a practical matter today, three plaintiffs' firms dominate the securities
class action industry: Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann; Coughlin, Stoia,
Geller, Rudman & Robbins; and Grant & Eisenhofer," which currently employ 56,
180, and 60 attorneys, respectively, according to the firms' web sites, last visited
June 19, 2011).
43. The rest of this analysis of firm size matches present firm size with
securities class action settlement data from 2009-2010, unless otherwise noted.
44. ROBBINs GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, http://www.rgrdlaw.com (last
visited June 19, 2011).
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2010;45 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, with 56 attorneys, 4 6
served as lead or co-lead counsel in 10% of all securities class action

settlements in 2009-2010;47 and Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check
(formerly Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check), with 110
attorneys,4 8 Milberg, with 76 attorneys,4 9 and Labaton Sucharow,
with 62 attorneys' 5 0 were each named as lead or co-lead counsel in
7% of securities class action settlements in the same two-year time
period.
This phenomenon has persisted since the Private Securities
52
Before
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was enacted in 1995.
splitting in mid-2004 into Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman (now
Milberg) and Lerach Coughlin Stoia & Robbins (now Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd), the large Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach had served as lead or co-lead plaintiff counsel in
approximately 50% of all securities class action settlements since the
passage of the PLSRA.5 3 After that split, the two successor firms
45. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 14 (2011)

[hereinafter SCAS 2010 Review], available at http://www.comerstone.com
/files/News/029b3 1a7-ff84-4000-b 1ff-dl 77014ced27/Presentation/NewsAttachme
nt/fd 13e 1e4-5564-4d46-86a3-8 82f232147a9/CornerstoneResearch Settlements_
2010 Analysis.pdf. These figures reflect a firm's percentage (as either counsel or
lead counsel) of all security class action settlements.
46. BLB&G, http://www.blbglaw.com/attorneys/index (last visited June 19,
2011).
47. SCAS 2010 Review, supra note 45, at 14.
48. KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP, http://ktmc.com/about

attorneys.php (last visited June 19, 2011).
49. MILBERG LLP, http://milberg.com (last visited June 19, 2011).
50. LABATON SUCHAROW, http://www.labaton.com (last visited June 19,

2011).
51. SCAS 2010 Review, supra note 45, at 14.
52. See Choi & Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers, supra note
38, at 1514 (referring to data sets confirming that the largest firms dominate class
action suits post-PSLRA); Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 2, at 323-24
(discussing studies showing the persistence of market concentration in the
securities plaintiffs' class action bar following enactment of the PSLRA).
53. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2006 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 16 (2006)

[hereinafter SCAS 2006 Review], available at http://www.cornerstone.com/
files/Publication/dl 3 a 9 el f-b320-4884-9f25-13542dd2bed8/Presentation/Publicatio
nAttachment/a3a3d386-3e02-4f66-904d-14e30al 34e80/ComerstoneResearchSe
ttlements 2006.pdf.
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continued their predecessor's dominance, and through 2006 they
together accounted for over half of all securities class action
settlements each year.54 After the indictment of Milberg Weiss in
mid-2006, its market share declined from 23% in 2006, to 7% in
2009-2010.55 Over the same period, the other plaintiffs' firms
commanding the highest market shares remained relatively constant;
their percentages of all settled cases and comparative rankings have
fluctuated, but the same large firms continue to dominate the
securities class action field.5 6
While similar data regarding plaintiffs' firms in other practice
areas are more elusive, the information that is available suggests that
the leading plaintiffs' class action firms are large. Only one firm on
the Legal 500's 2011 ranking of five leading plaintiffs' labor and
employment firms has fewer than 10 attorneys, and, on average, the
firms on this list have approximately 27 lawyers. 57 For example,
Lieff Cabraser, which handles employment litigation, among other

54. Id.
55. See James McDonald, Milberg's Monopoly: Restoring Honesty and
Competition to the Plaintiffs Bar, 58 DUKE L.J. 507, 532-33 (2008) (stating that
as of 2006, Milberg commanded 23% of all settled cases). See also ELLEN M.
RYAN & LAURA E. SIMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS: 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 14 fig. 13 (2010), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/029b31a7-ff84-4000-blff-dl77014ced27/
Presentation/NewsAttachment/fdl3ele4-5564-4d46-86a3-882f232147a9/Cornerst
one ResearchSettlements 2010_Analysis.pdf (citing to the 7% market share of
settlements in 2009-2010).
56. Compare SCAS 2006 Review, supra note 53, at 16, with SCAS Review
2010, supra note 45, at 14 (reporting the same large firms in both reviews).
57. See THE LEGAL 500, http://www.legal500.com/c/united-states/litigation/
(last
mass-tort-and-class-action-plaintiff-representation-labor-and-employment
visited June 19, 2011) (listing five leading plaintiff firms: Altshuler Berzon (21
attorneys); Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian (15 attorneys); Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (60 attorneys); Outten & Golden LLP (32
attorneys); Rudy, Exelrod, Zieff & Lowe, LLP (5 attorneys) (firm size data
compiled from firm websites, last visited June 19, 2011)). The Legal 500 lists
represent practices gaining nationwide recognition, and thus, while the lists do not
indicate the market share of each firm, we treat them as representative of the
leading firms in these practice areas.
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categories of litigation, was founded in 1972, and has grown steadily
over time to 60 lawyers in three offices.'
The dominance of large plaintiffs' firms is also evident in the
antitrust class action context. Again looking to the Legal 500's 2011
list of the top eight leading plaintiffs' firms in this field, we see large
firms with a national presence-the firms on this list range from 15
attorneys to just over 200.59 A few of these firms have experienced
significant growth over the past decade: Boies, Schiller & Flexner
LLP, for example, grew from approximately 100 attorneys in 2001 to
202 attorneys at present, 60 and Susman Godfrey LLP increased from
approximately 50 attorneys in 2001 to around 90 today.61 Both firms
handle a wide array of cases in addition to antitrust litigation.
There is yet another way to demonstrate the supremacy of
larger firms in class litigation: randomly selecting nearly any casemanagement order appointing plaintiffs' attorneys and firms to
leadership positions in high-profile MDL litigation 62 matters reveals
that, when presented with a choice, judges gravitate toward
58. Compare Kritzer, supra note 41, at 232 ("Lieff Cabraser . . . with 45
attorneys based in San Francisco"), with LIEFF CABRASER, http://www.lieff
cabraser.com/ (last visited February 29, 2012) (providing more recent firm data).
http://www.legal500.com/c/united-states/
THE LEGAL 500,
59. See
litigation/mass-tort-and-class-action-plaintiff-representation-antitrust (last visited
June 19 2011) (listing eight leading plaintiff firms: Berger & Montague, P.C. (69
attorneys); Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll LLP (60 attorneys); Hausfeld LLP (19
attorneys); Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP (over 200 attorneys in 11 offices
nationwide); Heins Mills & Olson PLC (12 attorneys); Labaton Sucharow LLP
(more than 60 attorneys); Susman Godfrey LLP (90 attorneys in 5 offices
nationwide); Zelle Hoffman Voelbel & Mason LLP (71 attorneys nationwide)
(firm size data from firm websites, last visited June 19, 2011)). This list includes
firms that self-identify as litigation firms due to their defense work, in particular
Susman Godfrey, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and Zelle Hoffman Voelbel & Mason.
60. Only a fraction of the Boies, Schiller & Flexner attorneys regularly
prosecute plaintiffs' class actions.
61. Compare Kritzer, supra note 41, at 232 ("Boies, Schiller & Flexner .
with one hundred lawyer[s] . . . in ten cities, and Susman Godfrey with more than
fifty
lawyers...."),
with
BotEs,
SCHILLER
&
FLEXNER
LLP,
http://www.bsfllp.com/lawyers (last visited June 19, 2011) (listing current firm
size data) and Susman Godfrey LLP, http://www.susmangodfrey.com/ (last visited
June 19, 2011) (same). Both firms self-identify as litigation firms, rather than as
plaintiffs' class action firms.
62. "MDL litigation" refers to cases transferred and coordinated by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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established, big plaintiffs' firms. For example, in In re Oil Spill by
the Oil Rig "DeepwaterHorizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, MDL-2179, Judge Carl Barbier appointed a fifteen-member
steering committee, and a four-member executive committee (with
two persons overlapping with the steering committee), for a total of
seventeen lawyers, out of 121 applicants. 63 Most of the appointed
lawyers are from relatively large firms, and all of the executive
committee members hail from larger firms. 64 The BP litigation has
produced class action settlements which are currently under review
by the trial court.65
63. Case Mgmt. Order No. 8 at 1-2, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 747 F. Supp. 2d 704 (E.D. La.
2010) [hereinafter In re Oil Spill], available at http://www.mslitigation
review.com/uploads/file/MDL%20Steering%20committee%200rder.pdf.
64. The fifteen lawyers initially selected by Judge Barbier to serve on the
PSC are Brian H. Barr of Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty &
Proctor, P.A. (approximately 38 attorneys); Jeffrey A. Breit of Breit, Drescher,
Imprevento & Walker (6 attorneys); Elizabeth J. Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (60 attorneys); Philip F. Cossich Jr. of Cossich,
Sumich, Parsiola & Taylor (9 attorneys); Robert T. Cunningham of Cunningham
Bounds LLC (17 attorneys); Alphonso Michael Espy (associated with Morgan &
Morgan, with over 100 attorneys); Calvin C. Fayard Jr. of Fayard & Honeycutt,
A.P.C. (3 attorneys); Ervin A. Gonzalez of Colson, Hicks, Eidson (14 attorneys);
Robin L. Greenwald of Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C. (72 attorneys); Rhon E. Jones of
Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. (more than 60 attorneys);
Matthew E. Lundy of Lundy, Lundy, Soileau & South, LLP (8 attorneys); Michael
C. Palmintier of deGravelles, Palmintier, Holhaus & Fruge; Paul M. Sterbcow of
Lewis, Kullman, Sterbcow & Abramson (4 attorneys); Scott Summy of Baron &
Budd, PC (more than 60 attorneys); and Mikal C. Watts of Watts, Guerra, Craft,
LLP (about 20 attorneys). In addition, four lawyers were appointed to the
Plaintiffs' Executive Committee: James Parkerson Roy of Domengeaux Wright
Roy & Edwards (11 attorneys); Stephen J. Herman of Herman, Herman, Katz &
Cotlar, LLP (19 attorneys); Brian Barr of Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell,
Eschner; and Scott Summy of Baron & Budd, PC (39 attorneys). Id. at 1-2. All
firm data in this paragraph is from firm web sites, where available, which were last
visited July 17, 2011.
65. See Preliminary Approval Order [Economic] at 19, 29, 33, In re Oil Spill
by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010 (E.D.
La. May 2, 2012) (provisionally certifying Economic and Property Damages
Settlement Class; preliminarily approving of the proposed settlement; and
appointing the counsel previously appointed as Liaison Counsel and appointed to
serve on the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee as settlement class counsel), available
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/050220120rder(EconomicSett
at
lement).pdf (last visited July 25, 2012); Preliminary Approval Order [Medical] at
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The foregoing data reflect the stratification of the class action
plaintiffs' bar by showing that the largest firms dominate. Though it
is hard, especially at the margins, to characterize each firm that
prosecutes class actions as a particular "type" of law firm, crude
categorizations, with some descriptive value, are in circulation.
These categorizations turn in large part on law firm size and
The largest class action firms
dominant litigation strategy.
predominate. They tend to get appointed to leadership positions in
the most significant cases, and, as demonstrated below, are more
likely to possess relatively greater internal complexity.
Smaller firms that routinely participate in class litigation are
generally of three types:
* First, there are small firms with big aspirations, often
started by lawyers who exit larger partnerships. They tend
to follow the larger firms' business models, growing in
size and internal complexity over time, and pursuing
leadership roles in larger cases, often by joining forces
with other plaintiffs' firms, in ad hoc firms that function as
would a very large, internally complex plaintiffs' firm
(though with even less cohesion).
* Then, there are small firms with small aspirations: they
lack internal complexity, rarely get appointed to leadershi
positions in large cases, tend to file "copycat" complaints
15-16, 18, 22-23, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf
of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012) (provisionally certifying
Medical Benefits Settlement Class; preliminarily approving the Medical Benefits
Class Action Settlement; and appointing as settlement class counsel attorneys
previously appointed to serve as Liaison Counsel and as members of the Plaintiffs'
Steering
Committee),
available
at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov
/OilSpill/Orders/050220120rder(MedicalSettlement).pdf
(last visited July 25,
2012).
66. "Copycat" cases are actions "alleging the same injuries on behalf of the
same class of plaintiffs" often in multiple (state court) jurisdictions, a form of
jurisdictional gamesmanship CAFA was designed in part to address. See Tanoh v.
Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing Dow's argument
that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to 'game' jurisdiction statutes by filing
copycat cases). Copycat cases may be filed for reasons other than jurisdictional
advantage; for example, they are often filed by law firms seeking to free-ride off of
other firms' pre-filing investigations of new cases, and, also, may be used
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(which they have no intention of prosecuting through
trial), rarely have a case in their case portfolio that is
capable of funding firm operations individually, and, of
necessity, are more likely to be driven at any given
moment and to the extent practicable by hoped-for
attorneys' fees.
Finally, there are "outsider" firms, including, for example,
professional objectors, often solo practitioners, who
intervene in class litigation at specific points, often just to
hold up larger firms for a share of the fee, by threatening
to delay finality, and thus payment.
These last two categories of small firms are commonly
described within the plaintiffs' class action bar, colloquially, as
"bottom feeders." Of course, few if any lawyers or firms would so
self-identify; they are best identified by the pattern of their behaviors
over time. There is a bridge between law firm size and the business
models or practices that tend to be pursued by lawyers within firms:
law firm internal structure, discussed below. While small firms
(with internal structures that support the conventional account of
class counsel) exist, they are not the focus of this Article. Instead,
this Article primarily explores the characteristics of the largest, most
significant firms that dominate various practice areas, and are thus
more representative of today's practice regime.
B.

Law Firm OrganizationalComplexity Creates
Incentives Other Than Maximization ofLaw Firm
Profit

The conventional understanding of class counsel as
possessing a singleness of purpose in pursuit of maximizing law firm
profit abstracts out from the picture of the plaintiffs' attorney the
organizational architecture of the firm in which he practices and the
diverse incentives firm complexity produces. That is why Professor
Coffee and other commentators can alternate--often without
explanation-between referring to class counsel as "the plaintiffs
strategically to create support within administratively aggregated proceedings for
firms vying for leadership positions.
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attorney" or as a small firm: they see the law firm itself as irrelevant,
a black box that transforms inputs (attorney labor) into outputs (firm
revenue). 67 While organizational theorists, economists, and other
commentators have, in general and for some time, challenged models
of the firm incorporating black box assumptions,68 and while legal
67. See BRICKLEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 6 ("Traditional economic analysis
generally characterizes the firm simply as a 'black box' that transforms inputs
(labor, capital, and raw materials) into outputs. Little consideration normally has
been given to the internal architecture of the firm."); Jensen & Meckling, Theory
of the Firm, supra note 3, at 306-07 ("While the literature of economics is replete
with references to the 'theory of the firm,' the material generally subsumed under
that heading is not a theory of the firm but actually a theory of markets in which
firms are important actors. The firm is a 'black box' operated so as to meet the
relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby
maximizing profits .... ); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths,
Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REv. 531, 532-33 (2002) [hereinafter
Malloy, Regulating by Incentives] ("Although no single, authoritative description
of the black-box model exists, most formulations include three major components.
First, the model assumes that the organization is a monolithic entity that essentially
makes decisions as a natural individual would. Thus, the collective nature of the
firm and its internal features are largely ignored. Second, the model assumes that
the unitary firm makes decisions rationally .... Third, the traditional formulation
of the black-box model assumes that the firm has one dominant goal: maximizing
profits." (citations omitted)).
68. Organizational theory and organizational economics explore internal firm
characteristics to explain organizational form and behavior. See, e.g., Michael C.
Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 AcCT. REv. 319, 325 (1983)
(describing the emergence of the field of organizational theory, with its emphasis
on key organizational characteristics "which can explain why various
organizations function as they do," including "the performance measurement and
evaluation system . . . , the reward and punishment system," and "the system for

partitioning and assigning decision rights among participants in the organization").
See also Sarah Kaplan & Rebecca Henderson, Inertia and Incentives: Bridging
OrganizationalEconomics and OrganizationalTheory, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL SC.
509, 509 (2005) ("Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the
importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm's employees,
stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping
organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems
has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most
organizational theorists focusing their attention on critical problems in culture,
network structure, framing and so on-in essence, the social context in which
economics and incentive systems are embedded." (citations omitted)). The
organizational theory literature has influenced legal commentary on firms
generally. See Malloy, Regulating by Incentives, supra note 67, at 534 ("In some
areas, the legal literature has begun to relax the black-box assumptions. For
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commentators have moved past black box assumptions specifically
with regard to large corporate law firms,69 these same assumptions
have enjoyed uncritical acceptance in class action scholarship.

example, writers using principal/agent theory and other concepts of organizational
theory have breached the walls of the blackbox in the fields of corporate crime and
securities regulation. Yet in other areas, the black-box remains essentially intact."
(citation omitted)); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76
TEMP. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (2003) (describing firm "routines"-which refers to "a
wide range of formal and informal regular patterns of behavior that coordinate the
activities of the firm members," including "communication routines," as well as
"standard operating procedures that control production activities, budgeting and
resource allocation procedures"-as driving firm behavior with regard to
regulatory compliance).
69. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM, 3, 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter
GALANTER & PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS] (attributing the growth of large
corporate law firms to the fundamental structure of the law firm "that crystallizes
around the exchange between senior and junior lawyers" structured by the
"promotion-to-partner tournament"); Robert L. Nelson, PARTNERS WITH POWER:

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 38 (1988) ("My
argument is that a fundamental shift in the market for corporate legal services has
resulted from the expanding functions of law in the affairs of major corporate
actors . . . thus creating new tensions in the traditional law firm structure. The

resulting 'new structure' of firms is marked by the emergence of a distinctive
managerial elite and increasing disparities in the status and income of partners," as
well as "a new managerial ideology"); Edward A. Bernstein, Structural Conflicts
of Interest: How a Law Firm's Compensation System Affects Its Ability to Serve
Clients, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2003) (considering the relationship
between income allocation schemes and the possibility that a corporate attorney's
advice will be tainted by self-interest, in possible violation of Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing
Among the Human Capitalists:An Economic Inquiry into the CorporateLaw Firm
and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 320 (1985) ("In turn,
recognition of the central importance of the method of income division in a law
firm suggests a number of hypotheses concerning other important aspects of firm
organization, including hiring and partnership selection policies. Our principal
concern is thus to use a different theoretical framework to study an important
social phenomenon-the large firm."); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency
Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1707 (1998) (considering
effect of ethics rules on firm structure); S. S. Samuelson, The Organizational
Structure of Law Firms: Lessonsfrom Management Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 645,
645-46 (1990) ("Management theory and the impact of structure on organizational
problems are foreign topics to most lawyers. Moreover, scholars have offered
little practical guidance. Although management theory is rich in literature on
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Internal firm structure shapes decision-making in ways the
conventional account of class counsel does not address. 70 Lawyers
serving as class counsel have interests that diverge from the interests
of the class members. But to appreciate that divergence we must go
beyond the simplifying assumptions animating the conventional
understanding of the entrepreneurial lawyer. To identify the
incentives potentially affecting attorney behavior in a given class
action, it is not enough to know that the attorney works in a for-profit
law firm. We also want to know precisely who within the firm will
manage the litigation, how he is compensated and promoted, the
extent to which he directly bears the risk of funding the litigation, his
level of firm attachment, and his ability to direct firm resources to
the litigation. We need to know, in short, both how a firm is
organized, and how the attorney managing a particular case is
situated within the firm's architecture. Such information does not
allow us to precisely predict an attorney's case-management
decisions; but consideration of these factors does test the
reasonableness of the black box assumption of cohesion, which in
turn tells us something about whether efforts to regulate attorney
behavior premised on that core assumption are likely to be
successful.
Larger firms tend to have complex internal structures. Such
complexity undermines cohesion in two primary ways: by creating a
wedge between firm ownership and control of case-investment
decisions7 1 and by creating incentives for case managers other than
maximization of firm profit. 72 To understand agency costs in class
generic organizational structures, academic researchers have largely neglected the
application of this literature to the internal organization of law firms.").
70. The rest of this discussion assumes that class counsel is essentially selfseeking, to squarely meet the conventional account of class counsel on its own
terms (i.e., without contradicting the conventional understanding that fiduciary
models of class counsel are descriptively inaccurate).
71. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 3, at 308 (arguing
that agency conflicts can distort a firm's investment decisions if ownership and
control interests do not reside in one person). The situation is in fact even more
complicated, because many cases are prosecuted by consortiums of law firms
functioning in effect as ad hoc firms, where cohesion is arguably even more
elusive. The effect on attorney incentives of inter-firm coordination and collective
action is a separate topic not explored herein.
72. The opportunity of individuals within a firm to pursue their own distinct
interests is an agency issue. See George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met
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actions, we must first understand what class counsel really wants,
and how he achieves it.
1.

Firm Ownership May Not Track Case
Management Authority

Most law firms are partnerships, in which ownership is
measured in percentage points.7 3 Each equity partner's annual
income is a product of his equity stake (percentage) and the firm's
profit. The spread of equity by percentage point, rather than by case,
creates a wedge between the interests of the firm and the particular
Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 284 (1999) ("Agency
problems may be compounded by the fact that clients, their lawyers, and third
parties may all have agency problems within themselves .

..

. The paradigmatic

agency problem 'within the lawyer' is the law firm in which the lawyer practices.
Lawyers are agents of their firms as well as of their client, and difficulty of
monitoring poses problems in the lawyer-firm relationship similar to those in the
lawyer-client relationship."). Recognition of this issue traces, in part, to Jensen
and Meckling's work conceptualizing the firm as a "nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals." Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra
note 3, at 310 ("Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with
employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc. The problem of agency
costs and monitoring exists for all these contracts . . . ."). Jensen and Meckling's
analysis, which is not focused on law firms in particular, undoubtedly inspired
law-firm-specific analyses. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 69, at 333
("The potential for each participant in the organization to maximize his selfinterest at the expense of that of the other participants . . . can greatly reduce or
even eliminate the potential for gain from organization. An agency theory of
organization focuses on how organizations maximize the gains from cooperation
by adopting structures which reduce the potential for participants to pursue their
individual, rather than their collective, self-interest.").
73. See Christel Walther, LLC and Lawyers: A Good Combination?, 50 LoY.
L. REV. 359, 366-67 (2004) (defining partnerships, limited partnerships, limited
liability partnerships, and limited liability companies, and noting: "The partnership
is the default format for all associations of two or more persons who carry on a
business or profession for profit as co-owners. For the creation of a partnership, a
written agreement and filings are generally not required, but there can be
agreements, for example, on how the profits shall be shared or who shall manage
the partnership. If there are no agreements on profit-sharing or management
powers, all partners share profits and losses equally and render decisions
together . .. [An LLP] shields the partners from liability for the professional
conduct of their fellow partners in most of the states. Some newer LLP statutes go
even further and provide a shield against personal liability for partnership
obligations much the same as for shareholders in a corporation . ...).
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attorneys working on any one litigation matter; the outcome of any
case that an equity partner manages may have only a negligible and
indirect impact on his income.
This decoupling of ownership and control can occur even in
smaller firms. Assume we have a three-lawyer firm with two equity
partners, A and B, with equity stakes of 80 percent and 20 percent,
respectively. C is a senior non-equity attorney. Each attorney
manages one-third of the firm's case portfolio and makes casemanagement decisions on his own cases. Assume, further, that one
of the cases, managed by B, is expected to bring in revenue of $10
million (in attorney's fees and cost reimbursement) before the end of
the accounting year. A, B, and C know the firm's total annual
expenses and are aware of the fee expected in B's big case. Assume
the annual expenses of the firm are projected to be $4 million,
including C's salary, firm overhead and case investments (hard
costs). Assume the firm distributes 50 percent of firm profits each
year and has no outstanding credit line. For the current year, A
expects an income of $2.4 million ($3 million multiplied by .80), and
B expects an income of $600,000, even if no other case produces
revenue. In this hypothetical, one case funds the entire firm's
operations and produces income for the equity partners, allowing the
attorneys to focus on their other cases without regard to meeting the
firm's bottom line or, depending on their personal preferences, their
own perceived needs for direct income. The hypothetical is designed
to avoid placing financial pressure on the case managers; but it
reflects the reality that a fraction of any class action law firm's case
portfolio at any given time may satisfy the revenue needs for the
firm, creating spaces where individual attorneys managing other
cases feel no direct or immediate link between the short-term
outcome in any case and their own financial well-being. Also, the
example highlights that, within law firms, case control may not track
firm ownership. A, with 80 percent equity, has the greatest stake in
any fee, but, in our hypothetical, has only a one-third chance of
actually making case-management decisions.
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A Lawyer's Perceived Self-Interest Is Shaped
by Law Firm Practices 74

The assumption of cohesion (the uniform pursuit of the single
or predominating goal of maximizing law firm profit) is most
credible if class counsel are either solo-practitioners (so the lawyer's
interest and the firm's interest are co-extensive) or are embedded in
firms that are organized to maximize each attorney's sense that his
standing in the firm-with regard to equity, compensation,
promotion, ability to direct firm resources to his cases, or expected
longevity with the firm-is directly tied to the expected value of his
mix of cases, individually, and relative to the net expected value of
the cases managed by other attorneys in the firm. To the extent a
self-interested attorney sees his interests as resting on factors other
than firm profit, the assumption of cohesion is not credible.
a.

Equity Allocation Schemes

Equity is typically fixed for some contractually established
period of time as set forth in a partnership agreement. Usually, the
agreement specifies the procedure for revising equity spreads, e.g.,
by unanimous consent, or majority or supermajority vote, either by
the partnership or by a committee to which equity allocation
decision-making is delegated. Two primary models of law firm
partner equity allocation have been described in the literature: the
merit system, based on some measure of contribution to firm income,
and the seniority or "lockstep" system, based primarily on longevity
in the partnership.7 5 Many law firms, in general, and plaintiffs'
firms, in particular, allocate equity based on both merit and seniority.
Equity allocation schemes that rest on factors other than each
partner's relative contribution to law firm profit are inconsistent with
the black box assumption of cohesion. Senior partners with a
substantial and protected equity stake may not perceive their income
74. Except where additional citations are provided, I base my comments
regarding structural characteristics of plaintiffs' class action firms on my direct
observations of such firms while practicing and working closely with many of the
leading plaintiffs' firms, nationally.
75. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1262 (defining the two primary
models of income allocation in large law firms).
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as being tied to the performance of the individual cases they happen
to manage. Where partner equity is fluid, self-seeking lawyers may
make case-investment and settlement decisions designed to game the
partnership equity allocation process, rather than to maximize law
firm profit. For example, if equity calculations rest on revenues and
losses, an equity partner angling for a greater stake may have a
disincentive to record disappointing outcomes in any particular year,
leading him to continue to litigate less promising cases that, from the
perspective of the firm, do not warrant continued investment.
Similarly, a partner who believes his equity allocation each year rests
on his perceived "value" to the firm may believe his value is a
function of factors other than the annual revenues his cases generate,
including his ability to generate new business, handle oral argument,
or conduct trials. He may thus make case-investment decisions
designed to emphasize these tasks to demonstrate his worth and
jockey for a larger equity position. The conventional account of
class counsel leaves no room for this kind of self-seeking.
b.

Compensationand PromotionSchemes
for Non-Equity Attorneys

The leading plaintiffs' firms have a mix of equity and nonequity lawyers. "Non-equity" attorneys do not own a percentage of
the firm. They are employees, from junior associates to relatively
senior and seasoned litigators, who happen not to have (and may not
want) an equity stake. While equity partners may be nominally
associated with or may at least loosely supervise every case, cases
may in fact be managed by non-equity lawyers. Non-equity
attorneys are typically compensated with a mix of a base salary and
bonuses. The market for labor among plaintiffs' firms is fluid;
lateral movement among firms is common. Senior lawyers capable
of running cases are valuable resources. Attorneys often negotiate
individualized compensation packages, which may vary by nonequity attorney within a single firm.
The compensation and promotion of non-equity attorneys has
been the subject of extensive commentary and analysis in the context
of large corporate law firms. For example, Galanter and Palay
identified the "tournament-to-partnership" as the engine of growth
for large corporate defense firms in the latter half of the twentieth

788

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 31:4

century. 7 6 While some aspects of the tournament undoubtedly exist
in many of the larger plaintiffs' class action firms, it is rarely as
systematic or predictable as the tournament conducted by the big
corporate firms studied by Galanter and Palay. For purposes of this
Article, a theory of the growth of the plaintiffs' class action firm is
not needed; instead, it is sufficient to note that whatever
compensation or promotion system is used creates incentives for
non-equity partners to game the system, rather than to maximize firm
profit. The more the system of compensation or promotion considers
factors other than contribution to firm net revenues as a result of
case-management decisions by non-equity attorneys, the more it
creates a wedge between the interests of the individual attorney and
the firm, undermining the assumption of cohesion.
Guaranteed compensation unaffected by each non-equity
attorney's contribution to law firm profit, combined with either an
elongated track to partnership or a closed partnership with no room
for advancement, creates the greatest divergence between the
perceived self-interest of such attorneys and the firm's interest in
maximizing law firm profit. Case managers whose income and
position in the firm are relatively detached from firm profit would
presumably have less motivation to deviate from client or other
Layering a bonus component into the attorney's
interests.
76. GALANTER & PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS, supra note 69, at 102
("Firms can conduct the tournament in various ways, so long as in the end they
promote a fixed percentage of associates and they offer a total compensation
package competitive in the market for associates. Some firms may eliminate
associates at given intervals (say, yearly); others may make decisions more
randomly; while still others, at least in theory, might wait until the end of the
tournament to notify the losers. The precise rules are dependent upon the
incentives the firm wants to maintain, the structure of its compensation package,
and firm culture .

. .

. Growth occurs because, at the end of the tournament, the

firm must replace not only the losing associates who depart, but also all those who
win and are promoted."). The toumament-to-partnership explanation of law firm
growth has critics. See George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell to
Tournaments? The Needfor an Alternative ExplanationofLaw Firm Structureand
Growth, 84 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1704 (1998) ("In order to come to a more
satisfactory understanding of intra-firm structure, we need to turn to an analysis of
inter-firm competition for top associates."); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581,
1586-89 (1998) (offering a revised version of the tournament, as a metaphor).
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compensation package only partially aligns the attorney's and firm's
For example, non-equity attorney bonuses may be
interests.
with
an upside for revenue, but little or no downside for
structured
losses. Similarly, where bonus programs are linked to the revenues
from the cases handled by an individual attorney, rather than to
overall firm revenue, that attorney's incentive is to invest sufficiently
in his own cases to maximize the fees they produce, without
considering the relative value of cases within the firm's portfolio.
Promotion opportunities also only partly close the gap in
interests between owners and non-owners. Promotion within the
firm often depends on factors other than just the revenue produced
by the cases on which a particular attorney works. As is the case
with equity partners, non-equity attorneys may see their value to the
firm as connected to their ability to demonstrate competence at
specific tasks, which could conceivably prompt them to focus on
those tasks when litigating (rather than on expected fees, as the
conventional account assumes). Partnership elevation may depend,
too, on relationships within the firm, causing non-equity lawyers to
focus on the cases they handle with or for partners whose votes are
considered key (again, without regard to the effect on law firm
profit). Similarly, promotion may encourage attorneys to continue
litigating cases that should be voluntarily dismissed after they
present no reasonable opportunity for success, because those
attorneys do not want blemishes on their records before promotion
decisions are made (an option the conventional account does not
consider when mapping the divergence of interests between class
counsel and the class members).
Finally, the track to partnership--especially in larger firmsmay be so elongated that non-equity attorneys do not see their
immediate case-management decisions in particular cases as having
a direct effect on their prospects, in the long term, to be elevated to
partner. Or there may be, at least as to some senior attorneys, no
reliable track to partnership because the attorneys are never promised
an equity stake. These attorneys may have less of an incentive to
consider the firm's profit when making case-management decisions,
absent other mechanisms to tie their interests to the firm's, such as a
compensation system that effectively links their salary to the firm's
performance or to the outcome of the cases on which they work.
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Case Financing

The conventional understanding is that the plaintiffs' class
action attorney making case-management decisions is identical to his
firm in terms of his perceptions of the rewards and risks associated
with litigation. Solo practitioners who self-fund their cases directly
experience the risk their case-management decisions impose on their
law firms. In multi-attorney firms, that experience of risk can be
maintained by, for example, requiring individual partners to fund
their own case costs, sharing only firm overhead with other law firm
partners, to achieve economies of scale7 7 with respect to firm
operational expenses. But most leading firms finance litigation in
such a way as to distance or insulate individual case managers from
the experience of risk. Some attorneys who make case-management
decisions do not contribute at all to the financing of litigation. These
non-equity attorneys may experience an upside for successful case
outcomes, for example, as a result of the compensation or promotion
scheme applicable to them, but they rarely, if ever, directly
experience risk associated with the firm's investments in litigation.
Equity partners typically bear responsibility for case costs in
proportion to equity stake, rather than in proportion to liability
inflicted upon the firm as a result of each partner's relative
contribution to the firm's liability for case costs. Just as with the
discussion of equity, above, this creates a wedge between the
interests of the persons making case-investment decisions and the
interests of the firm as a whole. The attorneys with the lowest
potential liability (and corresponding equity stake) may have the
greatest incentive to undertake risk, all other things being equal,
because they are bearing relatively less risk than their partners. The
conventional understanding is that attorneys making case-investment
decisions are relatively risk-averse; but, in fact, depending on the

77. Ronald J. Daniels, The Law Firm as an Efficient Community, 37 McGLL
L.J. 801, 810 (1992) ("Economies of scale arise when the fixed costs required to
produce a single unit of output can be reduced by increasing the output of the
good, thereby spreading these costs among a greater number of goods produced.
In the case of legal services, economies of scale can result from the cost savings
that can be generated by spreading the costs of certain fixed inputs, like libraries,
accounting, time-recording, data collection, and word processing facilities, over a
greater number of lawyers.").
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firm's internal structure and the case manager's place within it, the
opposite may be true.
d.

Resource Allocation Mechanisms

There are several types of resources within a firm to be
allocated, including: (1) attorney time, (2) paralegal time, (3) case
costs (e.g., expert fees, travel expenses), and (4) overhead (e.g.,
secretaries, file room staff). Firms easily monitor expenses in
categories 1-3, because relevant records are often maintained
electronically, and thus can be generated easily.78 Category 4
(overhead) expenses are not typically tracked by case.
A firm that is most cohesive in its pursuit of the goal of
maximizing law firm profit would allocate resources, to the extent
possible, based on regularly adjusted assessments of relative case
value, however defined, so that the "best" cases receive a greater
share of firm resources. In practice, however, many firms use some
variant of the "squeaky wheel" approach to allocating resources,
78. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)

§ 14.213 (2004)

(explaining the importance of accurate time records in calculating fees based on
the lodestar and requiring counsel to maintain contemporaneous records showing
"name of the attorney, the time spent on each discrete activity, and the nature of
the work performed" and suggesting that any such records be maintained in an
electronic format); id. at § 22.62 (recommending that when selecting lead counsel
or members of a steering committee, judges set forth their expectations regarding
number of attorneys to be assigned to particular tasks, the use of paralegals and
associates, and recordkeeping and time and expense reporting). Though the
percentage of the fund method is the preferred method for determining fees in
class actions, courts often use counsels' lodestar as a cross-check. See also In re
AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the percentage method
is generally favored in common fund cases, while the lodestar method is used to
check the reasonableness of the percentage fee award); In re Qwest Commc'ns
Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1149 (D. Colo. 2009) (utilizing the
lodestar cross-check as one of the factors used in determining the reasonableness
of the percentage award); Loudermilk Servs., Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 623
F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (employing a so-called "hybrid"
approach to the determination of attorneys' fees, applying the percentage of the
fund method and using the lodestar figure as a cross-check); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 766-67 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(applying the percentage of the fund methodology to a securities class action under
the PSLRA when approving an award of 9.25% of the fund, using the lodestar
method as a cross-check).
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which makes resource allocation, to the extent there is a gatekeeper
at all, a function of some combination of attorney seniority and
desperation.79 Most firms do not have an effective gatekeeper ex
ante analyzing the flow of resources within the firm; instead, case
staffing decisions are often made haphazardly with attorneys
managing cases negotiating with each other on an ad hoc basis. That
is not surprising. The larger the firm, the more polycentric the casemanagement structure (with individual or small groups of attorneys
running their own cases, and having relatively exclusive knowledge
of the elements of case value) and the less likely it is that any one
individual within the firm can mediate resource allocation disputes
by reference to the "value" (i.e., the likely contribution to firm profit)
of each case.
Less senior attorneys, as well as staff, often feel caught in the
middle of firm power struggles. Ironically, though, they often
independently determine who gets their time. In many instances, it
is the low-level associate or the staff member who decides how to
allocate his time, based on such factors as his feelings about
competing senior attorneys or particular cases.
Precise resource management calibrated to the expected
return on cases is exceedingly rare. This is partly because-as
discussed below-case value is often indeterminate. Even where
value can be estimated, knowledge of it is often not in the hands of
the persons making resource allocation decisions within the firm.
Moreover, that value itself is often dependent upon these very
staffing decisions, if it is assumed that greater investment in a case
correlates with better outcomes.80
79. Some firms have gatekeepers responsible for allocating resources within
the firm, who can be either an attorney or a senior staff member. Other firms
simply require the attorneys competing for firm resources to negotiate with each
other over scare resources.
80. Some commentators assume that greater investment predictably produces
better outcomes. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What
Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 401 (2000) ("In
general, the unequal investment incentive for defendants and plaintiffs in mass tort
cases translates into a much greater chance that the defendant, who aggregates all
classable claims automatically, will prevail on the common questions over the
plaintiffs' attorney who acquires fewer than all claims."); Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 2, at 689 (demonstrating, to a point, the
additional return generated by greater investment). But value sometimes rests as
much on the lucky find-such as a helpful former employee of a defendant with

CLASS ACTION ATTORNEYS

Symposium 2012]

e.

793

Degree ofFirm Attachment

Firm attachment or identification is one way of characterizing
the extent to which a lawyer internalizes the interests of the firm as
his own. That attachment may be a product of a number of
intangibles, including a law firm's culture and work environment,
the extent to which a lawyer likes or seeks the approval of his
colleagues, and the degree to which the firm, internally, disseminates
a clear and consistent formulation of the firm's interests. Even
within the two-dimensional world of the conventional account of
class counsel-which assumes that the firm's interest is maximizing
profit and that information regarding it is meaningfully shared
internally-firm attachment can be significantly influenced by one
particular factor: an individual attorney's expectation of continued
employment with the firm. The more fluid a firm's roster of
attorneys, the more likely it is that attorneys will calculate utility in
ways that diverge from the firm's interest in maximizing profit.
Attorneys who feel detached from the firm are more likely to make
case-management decisions to enhance their personal interests,
including: (1) reputation, (2) standing in the plaintiffs' bar or within
a particular jurisdiction or practice area, and (3) contacts with
organizations that can provide access to clients and future cases.

f

Law Firm Structure, the Conventional
Understanding of Plaintiffs' Class
Counsel, and a New Model

The foregoing analysis enables the identification of elements
of plaintiffs' law firm architecture relevant to (and implicit in) the
conventional understanding of plaintiffs' class action attorneys and
the juxtaposition of that understanding against a new model of
plaintiffs' class counsel addressing the current characteristics of the
The conventional account, when
leading class action firms.
inside knowledge who is willing to testify truthfully, or a particular document that
is discovered-as it does on the resources devoted to the case. Moreover, there is,
at some point in every case, a decreasing marginal utility of investment of attorney
time and resources, because cases are ready for trial after a finite amount of
investment, and because not every task performed to prepare a case is equally
important to the outcome.
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characterizing the plaintiffs' class action attorney's interests, looks
only at firm size and assumes that all plaintiffs' class action
attorneys are solo practitioners or small firms without internal
structural complexity of any significance. However, implicit in the
conventional understanding of plaintiffs' class counsel as cohesive in
pursuit of the one overriding goal of maximizing law firm profit are
the internal firm structural characteristics presented below. The
existence of firms with internal structures consistent with the
conventional understanding of plaintiffs' class action attorneys
suggests that accounting for law firm internal architecture does not
undermine the conventional account's usefulness with regard to
every lawyer or firm. Where the conventional understanding of class
counsel fails is with regard to the leading class action firms, which
are more likely to possess characteristics identified in the new model
and summarized in the chart below. The conventional account does
not correctly map the way the most significant attorneys' and firms'
interests diverge from the interests of the class members they
represent; and the conventional understanding of class counsel is
thus unreliable as a foundation for reform. As discussed in Part IV,
below, accounting for law firm internal architecture confronts that
problem.
The Conventional Understanding and the New Model of
Plaintiffs' Class Counsel
The Conventional
Understanding

Firm Size

Equity Concentration

The New Model

Small (one to five
attorneys)

Relatively larger (more
than five attorneys)

All case managers are
equity partners.

Relatively fewer case
managers are equity
partners.
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Equity is regularly
adjusted to reflect net
expected fees
anticipated in each
partner's cases.

Equity allocation is
infrequently modified and
rests on factors other than
expected fees, including,
among other things: (a)
seniority, (b) historical
performance, and (c)
wins but not losses, etc.

Non-equity attorney
pay is tied to
contribution to firm
profit; eligibility for
elevation to partnership
turns on contribution to
firm profit.

Non-equity attorney pay
does not depend on
contribution to firm
profit; partnership
eligibility turns on factors
other than contribution to
firm profit, such as
demeanor, special skill
sets, or relationships with
existing partners.

Attorneys making casemanagement decisions
their own case
costs.

Attorney contributions to
financing of firm
operations and case costs
are not fully dependent
on the risks and costs
each attorney imposes on
the firm.

Marginal caseinvestment decisions
turn on regularly
updated assessments of
the net expected fees in
each case.

Resource allocation
decisions rest on factors
other than the relative
value (in terms of
expected fees) of each
case, including, among
other things, partner
seniority.

Firm attachment is
high, in that attorneys
expect to remain with
the firm.

Firm attachment is low,
in that attorneys expect to
leave the firm.
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These law firm structural models or archetypes are not
presented to suggest that one can more reliably determine whether
suspicion of class counsel is warranted in any given case merely by
accounting for internal firm architecture. Instead, the models show
that the situation on the ground is more complicated and less
predictable than much of the academic literature suggests. Law firm
internal structure creates diverse incentives other than maximization
of law firm profit.
C.

Plaintiffs' Class Action Attorneys Invest Time in
Casesfor Complex Reasons Beyond Just Expected
Fees

The conventional understanding of class counsel predicts that
he will be disloyal at a particular point in time-namely, when his
next dollar of investment will not be adequately compensated by the
fee he will recover for that dollar. This characterization of class
counsel's disloyalty therefore relies on the idea that class counsel can
predict his fees with some certainty. This is unrealistic because fees
are often difficult to estimate. In addition, class counsel makes caseinvestment decisions for complex reasons unrelated to expected fees.
The existence of asymmetric interests is of little significance if the
potentially disloyal agent cannot know when the asymmetry exists
and effectively act on it.
1.

Fees Are Difficult to Predict

The conventional understanding is that the value of a case to
class counsel is the expected fee.81 In Figure A, above, the f-curveclass counsel's expected fee-is a constant function of the
settlement's size, which is itself just a function of class counsel's
investment of resources. Commentators more typically discuss class
counsel's expected fee as a function of the expected outcome for the
class (by trial or settlement) and the formula for calculating

81. See Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 2, at 686
("The key point is that the litigation stakes are asymmetric, with the defendant
focusing on the judgment or settlement and the plaintiff's attorney focusing on the
fee, which is typically a declining percentage of the recovery.").
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attorney's fees (e.g., percentage of the fund).82 In fact, expected fees
are far more indefinite and involve additional contingencies merely
implied by the conventional account, including: class certification,
appointment of the plaintiffs' attorney as class counsel, success on
the merits or by settlement, and the court's award of a particular fee
upon application by class counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The
following paragraphs examine each of these variables, highlighting
the sources of their indeterminacy. However the formula for
expected fees is stated, it is too imprecise to carry the weight it has
been given in the conventional account of how plaintiffs' attorneys
litigate and settle class actions.
Fees are typically a percentage of a case's total settlement
value, but quantification of actual damages is often more of an art
than a science. Except for the simplest of cases, the actual damages
involved in a lawsuit may depend on factors that are not susceptible
to precise calculation. Some components of injury may be difficult
to quantify, or unknown at the time of suit, either because all injuries
have not yet manifested or because the injuries, even if they have
manifested, can only be roughly estimated, producing a range of
possible values.
Class certification-another element of the expected fee
calculus-is often determined only after substantial case investment,
leaving plaintiffs' counsel in a position of uncertainty regarding both
the fact and scope of class certification (e.g., certification as to all
claims, or only as to particular issues or subclasses, etc.). 83 Class

82. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 348-50 (1998) (identifying as determinants of class
counsel's expected fees in a class case both the amount of the class recovery and
the method by which any fee is calculated). Cf Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
"Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1394-97 (2000) (characterizing the "expected fee"
as the "average" fee award in "similar" cases).
83. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (noting
the "rigorous analysis" that a trial court must undertake when resolving a class
certification motion will "frequently" entail "some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiffs underlying claim"); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24,
39 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that amendments to Rule 23 in 2003 precluding
"conditional" certification orders and delaying the expected timing on class
certification determinations support the need for "a more extensive inquiry into
whether Rule 23 requirements are met than was previously appropriate," including
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certification is granted if plaintiffs demonstrate, on a proper record,
that all of the prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied, including 23(a)
and at least one sub-section of Rule 23(b). 84 The exact scope of the
class certified and the identity and number of class counsel dictate
the size of the case and the degree to which a plaintiffs' attorney
controls it and can thus seek a fee for whatever benefit he confers on
the class. Class certification is often only one of several aggregation
devices potentially applicable to a given category of litigation,
including both contractual and administrative aggregation in state
and federal courts.85 The more fragmented the litigation, the more
jurisdictions that may provide the vehicle for a litigated judgment or
settlement, and the more difficult it is to estimate either the
likelihood of certification or of a particular firm being appointed as
class counsel. The probability that a particular attorney seeking
appointment as class counsel will achieve a desired level of
aggregation in his chosen forum may depend on factors that change,
too, over time, including evidence developed in pre-certification
discovery, the schedule in competing cases, and the outcome of
administrative aggregation efforts.
Estimates of the probability of success on the merits are
similarly mostly guesswork. Expected outcomes on the merits are
dependent upon procedural developments, including the outcome of
disputes regarding jurisdiction, the pleadings, discovery, and
summary judgment. These developments may not be foreseeable.
For example, a race discrimination class action lawsuit against
Texaco settled in 1996 for what was then a record amount-$176
million-after the plaintiffs obtained an audio-recording in which
top company executives admitted to destroying documents
responsive to discovery requests and used racial slurs to refer to the

findings regarding satisfaction of the elements of Rule 23 that happen to overlap
with the merits).
84. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1437 (2010) ("By its terms this creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff
whose suit meets the specified criteria [of Rule 23] to pursue his claim as a class
action.").
85. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships,Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
296, 329 (1996).
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class action plaintiffs. 86 Similarly, in Holocaust-era class action
litigation against several Swiss banks, described more fully below,
the value of the litigation was dramatically enhanced after a nightwatchman rescued documents from the shredder that were arguably
related to the plaintiffs' claims.8 7 It is impossible to quantify and, at
the same time, difficult to overstate how the evidence of the
defendant's document destruction added to the value of the litigation.
Expected outcomes hinge, too, on post-trial developments, long after
the most significant case investments are made, including appeals.88
The likely fee associated with any hoped-for outcome is even
more indeterminate than the expected outcome at trial. 89 Fees are
subject to court approval 9 0 and cannot be predicted based only on the
value of the benefit class counsel's efforts confer upon the class.91
Fees are commonly calculated as a percentage of the common fund,
though the precise percentage can vary dramatically, depending on
86. Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See
also Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Pushing Weight, 33 T. MARSHALL L. REv.
95, 111-12 (2007) (describing the events of the Texaco case).
87. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F. Supp. 2d 301, 316
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing incident).
88. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 512-15 (2008)
(finding a punitive damages award resulting from a class action jury trial to be
excessive after nearly fifteen years of appeals from the 1994 jury verdict); Avery
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 855 (Ill. 2005) (decertifying
plaintiff class and reversing trial court judgment after approximately five years of
appeals from the 1999 class action jury verdict and trial court judgment).
89. MDL judges can reduce some of the ex ante uncertainty in that setting by
issuing case management orders providing for compensation to counsel for doing
common benefit work. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note

78, at App. A (reproducing Pretrial Order No. 127, the Amended Case
Management Order, from In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F.
Supp. 912 (D.P.R. 1991), and stating, in regards to fees for attorneys doing MDL
work: "Once any settlement approved by the Court is finalized, a percentage
amount (to be determined later but probably less than ten percent (10%)) of the
gross settlement amount will be ordered deposited into a special account and will
be used to pay PSC [Plaintiffs' Steering Committee] members a fee for their
services as well as to reimburse the PSC for authorized expenditures")).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
91. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 78,

§ 14.121

(describing the variation in percentage awards and noting emerging judicial
resistance to the use of "benchmark" percentages); Becker, Third Circuit Task
Force, supra note 35, at 705-07 (recommending that courts avoid rigid adherence
to percentage benchmarks).
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the size of the fund, the type of case, the judge's views of fees
generally and of the particular plaintiffs' counsel involved in the
case, and the response of class members to the notice of the
anticipated fee application. The range of fees awarded in big fund
cases, from the low single digit percentages to over one-third,9 2
makes fee-driven marginal investment unreliable; class counsel's
best basis for achieving a substantial fee is to get the maximum
common benefit for the class. 93
Attorneys can and do attribute a working "hunch" of a value
to cases, based on prior experience with similar claims and on
experience litigating in particular jurisdictions, or against specific
defendants, law firms, or insurers. But these hunches-often
expressed as broad possible ranges rather than as precise figurescan vary dramatically over time and, separately, among different
lawyers. Until sufficient discovery is conducted, these hunches may
not even be expressed in dollar figures; characterizing a case as
"big" may be as precise as it gets.
92. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements
and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 832-33 (2010)
[hereinafter Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study] ("Not only do district courts often
have discretion to choose between the lodestar method and the percentage-of-thesettlement method, but each of these methods leaves district courts with a great
deal of discretion in how the method is ultimately applied," which partly explains
the range of fees found in a study of cases settled in federal court in a two-year
window, "from 3 percent of the settlement to 47 percent of the settlement."). See
also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732,
776-77 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (listing, in a chart, the percentage fee awards for postPSLRA securities fraud class actions with settlements of $400 million or more and
finding awards ranging from 1.73% to 21.4%); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1210-11 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing the percentage
attorney fees award in recent mega-fund settlements with awards ranging from
25.4% to 35.5%); WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE, & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17:25 (4th ed. 2008) ("To avoid depleting the
funds available for distribution to the class, an upper limit of 50 percent of the fund
may be stated as a general rule, although even larger percentages have been
awarded."); Stuart J. Logan, Dr. Jack Moshman & Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Attorney
Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, 24 CLASS ACTION REP. 167 (2003)
(surveying fee awards in 1,120 cases representing aggregate class recoveries of
about $41 billion in common fund cases between 1973 and 2003 and documenting
variability in percentage awards).
93. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 78, § 21.71
("Compensating counsel for the actual benefits conferred on the class members is
the basis for awarding attorney fees.").
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The difficulty of estimating case value could be thought to
make class counsel generally less likely to invest in cases, or at least
less likely to invest in cases where fees are more uncertain, due to
risk aversion. That may be especially true in smaller cases, as
explained below. The point here is not that class counsel should
make the "correct" level of investment in every case without regard
to fees, but, instead, that marginal case-investment decisions are
rarely pegged to expected fees with anything close to the level of
precision necessary to say that expected fees, alone, explain such
investment choices. Expected fees shape case investment in a
relatively attenuated and rough fashion, at best. 94
2.

Factors Alien to the Conventional Account
May Dictate Case Investment

"Case value" is simply too amorphous to produce anything
other than the crudest relationship between it and attorney caseinvestment choices. If we assume that lawyers are self-interestedcabining, for now, the diversity of interests produced by law firm
structural complexity, discussed above-how do lawyers make
marginal case-investment decisions (e.g., whether to invest
additional time in a case or to settle)? To begin to answer that
question, it is helpful to identify two general categories of class
Large possible recoveries dilute the
cases: large and small.
meaningfulness of case value, such as it is, as a determinant of
marginal case investment. Even with relatively indeterminate or low
probabilities of success, very large cases present sufficient incentive
to fund litigation through a final judgment, without necessitating feeThe smaller the expected
driven marginal case investments.
94. As discussed in note 28, supra, the difficulty pegging case investment to
fees is particularly relevant to one particular form of agency cost problem, i.e.,
shirking, where class counsel invests too little in litigation. It is not a counter to
the "sell out" principal-agent problem, where, at the time of settlement
discussions, in exchange for an agreement regarding a substantial fee, class
counsel agrees to accept less relief for the class. The arguments regarding firm
structure, discussed above, relate more squarely to the "sell out" problem that
arises at the moment of settlement; to the extent a particular lawyer is less focused
on maximizing law firm profit, he is less likely to trade class benefits for fees
(though, as noted, may still pursue selfish interests at the expense of the class that
the conventional account of class counsel does not acknowledge).
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recovery, the more likely it is that lawyers, however inefficiently,
will attempt to tailor investment and settlement decisions to
anticipated results.
Three case examples are worth mentioning here to illustrate
both valuation difficulties and the absence of a precise relationship
between, on the one hand, expected fees and opportunity costs, and,
on the other, marginal case-investment decisions, at least in larger
class actions. 95 For each case example, it is possible to loosely
reconstruct early estimates of case value using the elements implicit
in the conventional account, including, as discussed above, actual
damages, the likelihood of class certification, the likely outcome at
trial, and the possible range of attorney's fees that could be awarded;
mapping that formula for case value against the case-investment
decisions actually made by class counsel demonstrates that-except
at one point, in one instance, when case value was essentially
reduced to zero-estimated case value did not determine counsel's
marginal case investments. Further-as it turned out-the weakest
case produced the best outcome (for class members and also for class
counsel), turning attorney estimates of case value and likelihood of
success on their heads and underscoring the imprecise nature of
investment in class action litigation.
Case Example 1: In Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, named plaintiffs, on behalf of a proposed
nationwide class of more than four million State Farm automobile
insureds, sued State Farm for breach of contract and statutory fraud
because of its practice of specifying non-original equipment
manufacturer ("non-OEM") crash parts instead of OEM parts on
damaged vehicles. 9 6 Plaintiffs alleged that non-OEM parts wereby virtue of being manufactured by reverse engineeringcategorically of lower quality than what plaintiffs were promised
under their allegedly uniform insurance contracts. 9 7
95. These cases were selected for their size, because I have direct knowledge
of the case-investment decisions associated with them and because they have all
been finally resolved.
96. 835 N.E.2d 801, 810-11 (111. 2005).
97. Id. I served as one of the Court-appointed plaintiffs' class counsel in this
litigation and pursued a number of other "imitation parts" cases against other
automobile insurance companies in state courts across the country, some of which
settled while Avery was pending, but none of which provided a value benchmark
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Ex ante, at the time early and major case-investment
decisions were made, what was the value of the litigation? There
were millions of class members, a sampling of whom appeared to
have incurred losses in the range of at least a few hundred dollars, on
average. Still, no one knew the exact value of the litigation, and it is
unlikely that any of the attorneys who prosecuted the litigation
shared a precise estimate. When Avery commenced, the likelihood
of class certification was relatively high, given plaintiffs' theory of
the case, which emphasized manifestly common questions, and
favorable law on certification of similar claims in Illinois at that
point in time.98 The merits of plaintiffs' claims were untested9 9
because they were, individually, negative value suits and because
plaintiffs had only recently uncovered the alleged wrongdoing. The
aggregate dollar value of class plaintiffs' injuries was not known at
the time the litigation was commenced, at the time of certification,
nor before substantial fact and expert discovery was completed.
Plaintiffs' damages expert ultimately testified at trial to a broad
range of possible damages for the class, from several hundred
million dollars to well over one billion dollars; 00 the variability was
the result of missing data regarding whether non-OEM parts
specified by State Farm were actually installed on class members'
vehicles. 101 If plaintiffs could prove that State Farm violated the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, there was a possibility that punitive
damages would be awarded, though, again, a numerical estimate of
the likelihood of success would have been misleadingly precise and
without foundation; it could safely be assumed that-if awarded-

for Avery, given the absence of any momentum toward settlement in the Avery
case.
98. At the time Avery was filed, Illinois state courts were accustomed to
certifying multistate classes involving breach of contract and statutory fraud
claims, applying Illinois law to the claims of all class members where the
defendants were headquartered in Illinois. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 428
N.E.2d 478, 485 (Ill. 1981) (reversing trial and appellate courts' rejection of a
multi-state class asserting Illinois breach of contract and statutory fraud claims).
99. The legal claims, based on contract principles as well as the Illinois state
consumer fraud statute, were both well-established and relatively straightforward.
100. See Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 833 (indicating that damages as a result of
non-OEM parts could range from $658.5 million to over $1.2 billion).
101. Id.at833-34.
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punitive damages would likely be either a fraction or a single-digit
multiple of compensatory damages. 1 02
At any point between commencement of the litigation and the
moment the jury rendered its verdict, reasonable estimates of the
expected outcome at trial ("actual damages" discounted by the
possibility that the class would not be certified, and that plaintiffs
would not prevail on the merits), ranged from tens of millions of
dollars to several billion dollars. It would have been impossible to
reliably translate those possible trial outcomes into a likely fee, other
than to note that, in Illinois, at the time of the trial in Avery, courts
regularly used the percentage methodology to calculate fees in class
cases and often awarded such fees as a percentage of the common

fund.103
The Avery litigation lasted approximately eight years, from
commencement in July 1997 through the conclusion of appeals.' 04
In that period, plaintiffs' counsel conducted pre-certification
discovery, successfully moved for class certification, paid for
nationwide class notice, completed full fact and expert discovery,
and conducted a trial in 1999 that lasted nearly two months, resulting
in a $1.18 billion judgment for plaintiffs. 0 5 Defendants appealed.
At the intermediate appellate level, the judgment was reduced by
$130 million, but was otherwise affirmed, as was the order granting
class certification. 106 The Supreme Court of Illinois ultimately
reversed the portions of the appellate court decision that affirmed the
trial court on the certification issue and on the merits.107
At no procedural point in Avery did class counsel calibrate
case investment along the lines implied by the conventional account
102. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
425 (2003) (surveying typical punitive damage awards).
103. See, e.g., Ryan v. City of Chi., 654 N.E.2d 483, 491-92 (Ill. 1995)
(affirming the lower court's award of a one-third fee due to counsel's efforts, the
risk assumed, and the success of the litigation).
104. See Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 812 (noting that plaintiffs' original complaint
was filed in July 2007).
105. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 97-L-1 14, 1999 WL
955543, at *1 (111. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999), aff'd, 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
106. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1248, 1262
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
107. Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 863-64.
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or illustrated by Figure A above. Settlement was never presented as
a serious option; there was no "s-curve." Case value was never
determinate, so the "f-curve," to the extent it was considered, was
just a number deemed capable of dwarfing all anticipated litigation
investments. Similarly, contrary to the calculus suggested in Figure
A above, counsel's opportunity cost was, at no point, a meaningful
determinant of counsel's marginal case investment; the expected
outcome in Avery was never sufficiently definite to permit
particularly useful comparisons to the hypothetical next best use of
counsel's time except in the most broad-brushed way.
Instead, once the decision to proceed with the Avery litigation
was made, the level of investment was dictated principally by the
scope of the class certified by the court, the demands of trial
preparation, and, post-judgment, the appellate briefing schedule. In
terms of fact discovery, plaintiffs' counsel reviewed the documents
and deposed the witnesses necessary to prove each element of the
class members' claims. In terms of class notice, plaintiffs' counsel
paid for that level of notice that the court deemed to be warranted
under the relevant legal standards and the facts of the case.
Plaintiffs' counsel developed the expert testimony required to
support the class claims without more or less investment. The trial's
contours were shaped by the evidence, the length of time it took to
present and cross-examine witnesses, and counsel's sense of what
was needed to prove plaintiffs' claims or test the defendant's
defenses. Similarly, time invested in the (ultimately unsuccessful)
defense of the class judgment on appeal was dictated by the
arguments raised by State Farm and the schedules set by the
appellate courts, rather than by plaintiffs' counsel.
Case Example 2: A second case example is the original MDL
proceeding, In re: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products
Liability Litigation.'os Plaintiffs--owners of residential water wells
contaminated or threatened with contamination by the gasoline
additive MTBE-sought certification of a multi-state plaintiff class
against twenty oil companies for injunctive relief (testing and
remediation).10 9 The key hurdle was the motion for class
108. 209 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). I served as a Court-appointed
Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel in the MDL proceeding.
109. Id. at 328-29.
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certification. Individually, most of the private well-owner cases
were seen as negative value lawsuits because the cost of proving
liability, including causation, was close to the value of the relief
sought. Given the presence of individual issues and variations in
state law, certification was always deemed to be a low probability
event; the trial court described plaintiffs' counsel's approach to
certification as "creative" when denying class certification." 0 Still,
if certification had been granted, the value of the claims for
injunctive relief was substantial and could easily have reached
billions of dollars. So even discounted by the possibility that class
certification would be denied and that the cases would then not be
economical to litigate, the MTBE litigation had a net expected value,
ex ante, that justified the necessary investment of attorney time and
costs to undertake the litigation.
Until certification was denied, case investment was dictated
by factors other than those implied by the conventional
understanding of class counsel. Pre-filing informal discovery,
ultimately successful motion practice before the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, and the organization of a leadership structure
in the transferee district were all undertaken as a matter of course
and pursuant to the schedules set by the Panel and by the trial court.
Thereafter, time invested to successfully defeat defendants' motions
to dismiss"' was dictated by the scope of the briefs defendants filed,
and, again, by the schedule set by the court. Plaintiffs then sought to
conduct the level of discovery necessary to permit an informed
consideration of class certification. The scope of pre-certification
discovery was a function of: the proposed class definition (including
private well-owners in four states, seeking primarily injunctive
relief); the Rule 23 criteria; the class certification discovery and
briefing schedule set by the court; the available evidence (which was
substantial); and the court's orders on motions to compel. Expenses
associated with working the case up to the certification decision,
though significant, were a small fraction of the value of the relief
When the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class
sought.
certification, the case became uneconomical to litigate. It was at that
110. Id.at329.
111. See In re MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (indicating that the defendants' motion to dismiss the strict liability,
negligence, failure to warn, public nuisance, and conspiracy claims were denied).
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extreme point, only, that the expected value of the litigation (i.e.,
zero) directly shaped case-investment decisions; after certification
was denied, the private well-owner class actions were voluntarily
dismissed.
Thus, as with Avery, in MTBE, the conventional account of
plaintiffs' class counsel predicts or explains very little about how
class counsel chose to litigate the case. More specifically, Figure A
is completely inapposite; in MTBE, settlement was never an option,
and expected fees could not be estimated with any kind of precision.
As with Avery, MTBE was a high-risk investment that plaintiffs lost,
one that could not be meaningfully compared to any hypothetical
next best use of counsel's time, at least until the value of the
litigation was reduced to zero. At all points during which the
litigation was economically viable-i.e., until the court denied
plaintiffs' motion for class certification-case-investment decisions
were dictated, instead, by counsel's assessment of what was
necessary to properly advance the claims to a successful resolution
and by the case schedule established by the trial court.
Case Example 3: A final example is In re Holocaust Victim
Assets Litigation, a settlement administration which is just now
winding down, in 2011, after a class settlement was reached, in
principle, in 1998, and granted final approval in 2000.113 Beginning
in mid-1996, plaintiffs-including victims and targets of Nazi
persecution, and their heirs-prosecuted class actions alleging that,
in knowingly retaining and concealing the assets of Holocaust
victims, accepting and laundering illegally-obtained Nazi loot, and
transacting in the profits of slave labor, the Swiss bank defendants
collaborated with and aided the Nazi regime in violation of New

112. 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting final approval to
the proposed settlement of $1.25 billion for five settlement classes). I served as a
member of the plaintiffs' steering committee responsible for prosecuting the
litigation, and was ultimately appointed as one of the settlement class counsel for
the plaintiff classes defined in the settlement agreement.
113. See Holocaust Victim Asset Litig. Case, No. CV 96-4849, availableat
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/DocumentsNew/DistributionStats
2010.pdf (last visited May 24, 2011) (indicating the amount of Swiss bank
settlements through 2010).
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York, Swiss, and international law.114 Plaintiffs sought, among other
relief, an accounting and disgorgement of dormant accounts and
other ill-gotten gains. 1 The cases were consolidated before Judge
Edward R. Korman in the Eastern District of New York.
In nearly every respect, the Swiss litigation was more
difficult (and had a lower probability of success) than either the more
conventional Avery insurance litigation, or even the MTBE matter.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, actual damages were not
known, partly because the quantification of plaintiffs' injuries was
part of the relief sought, in the form of an accounting, and partly as a
result of the passage of time and destruction of records.116 The cases
presented novel issues regarding choice of law, statutes of
limitations, the applicability and effect of Swiss banking secrecy
laws, and plaintiffs' entitlement to an accounting and disgorgement
for-not just dormant accounts, but also-profits from the Swiss
banks' alleged activities laundering looted assets and transacting in
profits from slave labor."' Defendants asserted multiple possible
grounds for dismissal of the litigation; though motions to dismiss
were briefed and argued, the court had not ruled on them by the time
a settlement in principle was reached in August 1998.11 If claims
survived motions to dismiss, it was not at all clear that the court was
inclined to certify multinational plaintiff classes; however, it is not
114. See Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-era Litigation Through
the Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 212, 212 (2002)
[hereinafter Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-era Litigation] (indicating the
plaintiffs' determination to seek an accounting and disgorgement of perceived illgotten gains).
115. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 141-42.
116. It was not until the completion of an agreed-upon audit, which was
folded into the settlement of the claims, and the conclusion of work by various
historical commissions that it became clear that provable actual damages, at least
in regards to the dormant accounts, were roughly in line with the ultimate
settlement amount. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 59,
61 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting Swiss bank objections to valuation presumptions
regarding dormant accounts and describing audits and historical investigations of
bank conduct during and after World War II).
117. See generally Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting the Selection and
Positioning of Human Rights Class Actions in United States Courts: A Practical
Overview, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 623 (2003) (highlighting many of the
issues present in these cases).
118. Id. at 642-47.
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possible to more specifically quantify the possibility of certification.
Because actual damages were not known, it was not possible to even
crudely estimate an expected outcome at trial; it was clear, though,
that if key pre-trial hurdles could be successfully negotiated,
including Rule 12 and 23 motion practice, whatever claims were
ultimately tried would have tremendous value that would likely
dwarf case costs. It is highly doubtful that any lawyer making
marginal case-investment decisions had a more refined sense of the
expected outcome of the litigation on the merits.
The Swiss litigation was unusual in terms of the attorneys'
fees. Several of the lead plaintiffs' firms prosecuted the litigation on
a pro bono basis. Those lawyers who declined to waive fees did so
with the knowledge that any fees awarded would likely be less than
those typically awarded in other class actions. 119 So the net expected
value to counsel making investment decisions was clearly lower in
the Swiss case, ex ante, than in Avery and MTBE. That lower net
expected recovery did not dictate how the case was litigated. On the
one hand, it could be argued that the Swiss Holocaust-era cases were
"cause litigation," and that the cases, too, had value to the
participating firms that went beyond any anticipated fee, including
the value that comes from working on high profile litigation.
However, if case-investment decisions are meaningfully shaped by
expected fees (to counsel) and by perceived opportunity costs, then
one would expect to see, on balance, less effort in the Swiss
litigation than in the other categories listed above by way of
example. That did not happen. The Swiss case was litigated as
aggressively as possible by the attorneys who had leadership roles in
it, with investment decisions basically determined by the court's
briefing schedules and rulings limiting discovery, rather than by
counsel pegging marginal investment decisions to expected fees.
119. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that certain counsel had agreed to either prosecute the
litigation pro bono, or to donate their fees, and refusing to award risk-multiplier on
lodestar-based fee award to one of the firms seeking a fee). Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP donated the fee awarded to it in the Swiss banks
litigation to endow a clinical human rights chair at Columbia University Law
School. Karen W. Arenson, Bulletin Board; Human Rights Law at Work, N.Y.
at
at
B8,
available
Oct.
9,
2002,
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/nyregion/bulletin-board-human-rights-lawat-work.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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Unlike Avery and MTBE, the Holocaust-era class actions
against the Swiss banks resulted in a settlement. However, the
conventional account of class counsel provides little insight into the
timing or nature of the settlement. As a result of the combination of
the efforts of counsel, the trial judge's personal involvement in
settlement discussions, the political and extra-judicial movement that
coincided with the litigation, and the Swiss banks' interest in
achieving closure on the issue, the litigation resulted in the largest
human rights class action settlement in history, at $1.25 billion.120
That settlement point was a consensus figure, reached with the
participation of victim advocates and the judge presiding over the
litigation, rather than a figure selected by plaintiffs' counsel to
maximize fees.
These three examples illustrate that-in cases with relatively
larger possible values, however imprecisely measured-caseinvestment decisions are not typically made on a marginal basis by
reference to a meaningfully definite estimate of expected fees.
Instead, such cases represent rough calculated bets, where aggressive
case development of even novel or difficult claims can pay off
handsomely for the class, and, through that common benefit, for the
In such cases, calibration of marginal case
class counsel.
investments to expected fees is not necessary to make the litigation
viable; moreover, plaintiffs' counsel quite regularly lacks the
opportunity to select the end point of the investment continuum via
settlement.
It is in comparatively smaller cases that class counsel's caseinvestment calculus is more likely to be shaped, however crudely, by
counsel's rough estimate of the likely case outcome. It would not
make sense to litigate a case involving only, say, $5 million in actual
damages the way plaintiffs prosecuted the Avery, MTBE and the
Swiss banks litigation, each of which involved an investment of
lodestar and hard costs by class counsel, collectively, well in excess
of $5 million. The expected fee in the hypothetical case involving
$5 million in actual damages would be, at most, some fraction of that
120. See JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE:
INSIDE THE EPIC BATrLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 350-64 (2002)
(noting the involvement of all parties, including the trial judge, in reaching a
settlement); Ratner, The Settlement ofNazi-Era Litigation,supra note 114, at 21516 (describing key settlement negotiations supervised by Judge Korman).
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amount. Of relatively lower value, smaller cases more clearly
require counsel to at least attempt to calibrate case-investment
decisions. Even as to that subset of class actions, however, law firm
internal architecture may influence the case-management decisions
of individual attorneys in ways that the conventional account of class
counsel does not capture.
One might respond to the catalogue of "interests" other than
firm profit provided in the preceding section and to the discussion of
case investment and expected fees in this section by invoking the
concept of natural selection in markets, whereby, over time, firms
that more effectively maximize firm profit presumably edge out
firms that are, for whatever reason, less profitable. 1 2 1 By this logic,
firms that are closer to the new model in the preceding chart-i.e.,
those that adopt forms of internal organization that make their
constituent elements less cohesively pursue the goal of maximizing
law firm profit-will eventually be overtaken by more profitable
firms, and will disappear. Even if we accept the natural selection
thesis in general, we need not accept it in the context of plaintiffs'
class action law firms, which operate in the absence of a competitive
market. Plaintiffs' class action law firms are different from firms
that manufacture goods or services and compete with each other
primarily on the basis of price. An inefficient class action plaintiffs'
law firm may never be "edged out" because there are no consumers
choosing between the price of its "product" and any other more
efficient firm's product. 22 The client of a class action plaintiffs' law
121. See Malloy, Regulating by Incentives, supra note 67, at 587 ("Even
scholars who reject the black-box conception of the firm, such as Williamson and
Jensen and Meckling, use market selection to justify the assumption that firm
structure moves inexorably to the most efficient state.") (citing Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Function: An Application to
Labor-ManagedFirms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473 (1979)); see also
Sidney G. Winter, Jr., Economic "NaturalSelection" and the Theory of the Firm,
4 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 225, 225 (1964) (describing the assertion of "survival of the
fittest" arguments in response to critiques of the assumption of profit maximization
by firms).
122. But see Cheffins, Armour & Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation,
supra note 41, at 467 ("During the 2000s there was increasingly vigorous
jockeying among law firms who brought securities class actions for the lead
counsel role."). It is important to distinguish competition for control of litigation
from competition that is based on price of services; firms jockey for position
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firm never directly experiences the inefficiency described above
because the lawyer's fee is awarded by the court, typically as a
percentage of the total recovery, normally at the end of the case,
without any basis for comparison shopping for a cheaper deal ex
ante.
Why do plaintiffs' law firms tolerate inefficiency? The
absence of a truly competitive market allows plaintiffs' class action
attorneys to be satisficing (content with making a profit, rather than
profit maximizing). This then allows the partners to organize their
firm internal architecture to achieve goals other than maximizing
firm profit by, for example, constructing a reward system within the
firm that benefits particular partners or elements of the partnership
(e.g., a reward system that is focused on seniority, rather than on
relative contribution to law firm profit, or that rewards attorneys who
are loyal to the particular partners who establish firm reward
routines). In addition, there are information problems associated
with structuring the reward and resource allocation routines within
the firm around the one dimension of relative contribution to law
firm profit. For example, it may be difficult to ascertain, on a case
that lasts multiple years, which of several different attorneys within
the firm make case-management decisions and whose decisions
contributed to the profit, if any, ultimately generated by the case. So
attorneys structuring reward systems may use proxies for relative
contribution to law firm profit that feel more reliable, such as an
attorney's work ethic, or the skills possessed by an attorney,
reference to which in the reward system creates the very distortions
that are the subject of this Article.
It could be argued that lawyers would tend to flee inefficient
firms for more profitable firms in pursuit of greater profits, assuming
they could somehow identify them (a tough project, given the fact
that most plaintiffs' firms do not publish data showing profits per
partner). In fact, lawyers maintain their association with firms for
any number of reasons, one of which may very well be that they
appreciate or prefer a work environment that is more analogous to
the new model in the chart above. This is especially true among
class action plaintiffs' attorneys generally, who are a relatively
mainly through strategic moves unrelated to the price of the services they offer,
such as the choice of venue. Competition for position in cases thus does not
translate into an emphasis on efficiency.
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independent and colorful lot, and plaintiffs' firms that specialize in
complex or aggregate litigation in particular, which can, by virtue of
the pursuit of very large cases, generate enormous revenues for
partners who need not devote much effort to achieving the kind of
efficiency that economists deem paramount in other settings.

IV.

WHY

THE NEW MODEL IS IMPORTANT

Complicating the conventional account of class counsel has
three virtues. First, it is more descriptively accurate. Second, and
relatedly, it directs our attention to the need for particular empirical
work that has, to date, been largely overlooked. This empirical work
will shed light on what agency problems actually infect class action
litigation today. Finally, a more accurate account of plaintiffs' class
counsel and the particular agency problems at work in class actions
better positions us to assess the likely efficacy of reform measures,
particularly the choice between direct regulation versus market or
incentive-based approaches to managing agency costs.
A. The New Model Is More DescriptivelyAccurate
The new model of plaintiffs' class action attorneys presented
in this Article is more descriptively accurate than the conventional
understanding of class counsel, at least with regard to the large firms
that dominate the plaintiffs' class action bar. Descriptive accuracy
presents a real rather than a fictive target for both understanding and
managing agency costs in class litigation. What do plaintiffs' class
action attorneys want, and how do they achieve it? The answer is: it
depends on, among other things, the peculiar position of each lawyer
within his law firm's internal structure. As firm size and complexity
increase, the likelihood is greater that any particular attorney
managing cases from within that firm will face relatively dampened
pressures to maximize law firm income when making caseinvestment and settlement decisions. At the same time, complexity
creates new incentives relating to, among other things, the
For
compensation and promotion structures within the firm.
example, a non-equity attorney from a large firm who is managing a
particular case, whose income is not tied directly to the case outcome
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and who does not contribute at all to case costs and thus personally
experiences virtually no direct risk, but who believes, perhaps
because of the way promotion decisions are made, or perhaps
because he is thinking of switching firms, that his personal interests
would best be served either by getting the largest win possible for the
class, or, alternatively, by avoiding an outright loss during his
stewardship of the case, may actually over-invest in litigation.
Alternatively, his position in his firm's architecture or his inability to
peg case investment to expected fees, may, quite haphazardly,
prompt him to invest at a level the clients would consider optimal,
e.g., point X on Figure A. This Article commences the project of
mapping the plaintiffs' class counsel's actual incentives created by
law firm architecture; as it advances, the project should be guided in
part by further empirical research.
B.

The New Model's Complexity Underscores the Need
for Better EmpiricalResearch on the Actual Agency
Problems that Exist in Class Action Litigation

Empirical work measuring agency costs in class actions is
limited.123 Recent empirical work on class action outcomes and fees,
though rich and detailed, is not designed to specifically measure
agency costs, either as conventionally understood or as suggested by
the new model of plaintiffs' class counsel this Article provides. For
example, Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick's excellent empirical study
attempting to gather all class action settlements approved by federal
judges during the period 2006-2007 124 revealed a total of 688 class
settlements approved by federal courts in that window.' 25 Professor
Fitzpatrick found that the average and median time to settlement was
approximately three years;126 eighty-nine percent of the settlements
123. Fitzpatrick, An EmpiricalStudy, supra note 92, at 812 ("Despite all the
attention showered on class actions, and despite the excellent empirical work on
class actions to date, the data that currently exists on how the class action system
operates in the United States is limited."). Professor Fitzpatrick's empirical work
is among the most comprehensive in the literature. Id. at 812-13 ("As far as I am
aware, this study is the first attempt to collect a complete set of federal class action
settlements for any given year.").
124. Id. at 812.
125. Id. at 817.
126. Id. at 820.
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provided "cash relief," as opposed to just in-kind relief such as
coupons, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief (a telling figure,
given that the stereotypical "sell out" settlement, involving coupons
for the class and relatively large cash fees for class counsel, appears
to be implicated in, at most, a small fraction of federal court
settlements); 127 the settlements had a value of more than $33
billion,128 or roughly ten percent of the wealth transferred as a result
of all non-class tort actions during the same period;129 and the
settlements involved an average percentage fee award of
approximately fifteen percent, well below the roughly one-third
contingency percentage considered standard in non-class tort
cases. 130
What does this tell us about whether agency cost problems
systematically and predictably plague class actions? In fairness,
Professor Fitzpatrick did not ask this precise question. It is thus not
surprising that we cannot tell from his data how the settlement
amounts compare to actual case value or whether the lawyers
invested time and costs in the cases at a level that is consistent with
their clients' best interests. Nor can we measure the extent to which
law firm internal structure affects case outcomes or enables distinct
kinds of principal-agent problems based on the data as it has been
presented thus far. We can say, grounding our conclusions in
Professor Fitzpatrick's data, that class litigation involves substantial,
long-term investments by class counsel that generate significant
value to class members. But how that value compares to the value
that would have been created in the absence of agency costs-either
those mapped by the conventional account or by the new model-is
not known.
Other recent empirical studies similarly provide only
tantalizing hints about the nature and extent of agency costs in class
litigation; though, again, in fairness, they were not designed to
specifically measure such costs. Professors Eisenberg and Miller
found that the class recovery and risk undertaken by counsel
significantly shaped fee awards, while class certification for

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

824.
826.
830.
830-31.
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settlement purposes only did not. 13 1 Professors Eisenberg and Miller
updated their empirical study in 2010, with similar results.13 2 The
Eisenberg and Miller data is particularly helpful to courts seeking
information about trends in class action attorneys' fee awards. As
presented, the data does not permit measurement of agency costs as
conventionally framed, or as suggested by the new model presented
above.
To assess the true nature of agency costs in class litigation,
we can, using a more complete account of class counsel, search for
data that tracks the properly-defined divergence of interests between
class counsel and the class. If my more complete description of the
plaintiffs' attorney is correct, then it may be possible, by accounting
for variations among law firms, lawyers, and cases, to obtain more
refined information. Do firm size and internal complexity affect
case-investment strategies? Does the relationship of an attorney with
case-management authority to his firm's internal architecture affect
his case-investment and settlement decisions? Do lawyers in class
131. See Eisenberg & Miller, Attorney Fees, supra note 36, at 76 ("The
single most important factor determining the fee is the size of the client's
recovery."); id. at 77 ("Risk is also usually significant: fees as a percentage of the
recovery tend to be higher in high-risk cases than in other cases, and lower in lowrisk cases."); id. ("Settlement classes were not robustly significantly associated
with fee levels."); id. at 67 ("We could not reject the null hypothesis as to the
presence of a settlement class in non-fee shifting cases. This result casts some
doubt on the common perception that settlement classes are suspect because they
can be vehicles for collusion between defendant and class counsel."). For this
empirical study, Professors Eisenberg and Miller surveyed state and federal class
actions with reported fee decisions between 1993 and 2002, inclusive, in which the
fee and class recovery could be ascertained, along with additional class action data
from a previous empirical study. Id. at 28 (identifying data used for their analysis
and citing Stuart J. Logan, Jack Moshman & Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Attorney Fee
Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, 24 CLASS ACTION REP. 169 (2003), as

one of their sources for data); id at 44-46 (describing data and coding
conventions).
132. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.

248, 250 (2010) ("We find, regardless of the methodology for calculating fees
ostensibly employed by the courts, that the overwhelmingly important determinant
of the fee is simply the size of the recovery obtained by the class .

. .

. Although

the size of the class recovery dwarfs other influences, significant associations exist
between the fee amount and both the fee method used and the riskiness of the
case . . . . Fees were not significantly affected by the existence of a settlement

class . . . .").
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cases in fact have the capacity to meaningfully peg case investment
to expected fees? These are all questions that can and should be
asked. Professor Deborah Hensler's prior work suggests one way to
gather such data: ask the lawyers who are involved in class litigation.
She and her colleagues did so, profitably, in their survey of ten class
cases from the mid-1990s,1 3 though without focusing on the
organization structure of the individual law firms that prosecuted
such cases.134 The outcome may not be scientific, but the case
studies were revealing, partly because they did not precisely track
the conventional understanding of class counsel. Professor Hensler
reports that by peering "into the class action fishbowl, we found a
murky picture of Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions. In the ten
class actions we studied closely, plaintiff attorneys seemed
sometimes to be driven by financial incentives, sometimes by the
desire to right perceived wrongs, and sometimes by both."' 3 5 Asking
more precise questions about motive would no doubt expose yet
additional fault lines, including those relating to firm structure, as
discussed above.
C.

The New Model's Complexity Enables Us to Identiy
the Best Tools for Reducing Agency Costs

Proposals for reducing agency costs can be roughly divided
into two categories: first, market-based or incentive-based reforms
that are designed to better align class counsel's perceived interests
with those of the class, and, second, direct regulation approaches,
including, for example, the formulation of generally applicable
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
133.
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 5 (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER ET AL., CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS] ("The best sources of information on class action litigation

practices are the parties, lawyers, and judges involved in class action lawsuits.").
Professor Hensler and her colleagues selected ten class action lawsuits for "case
studies," focusing on consumer and mass tort damages class actions. Id. at 13839. One major source of information for the case studies was interviews with key
participants, including outside defense and corporate counsel, plaintiff class
counsel, judges, special masters, and, in some of the cases, objectors. Id. at 142.
They also studied case-specific documents. Id. at 143.
134. Id. at 79 (discussing collusion by reference to the conduct of law firms
handling case portfolios, without regard to the complicating factors discussed
above, including firm structure).
135. Id. at 401.
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standards governing the conduct or resolution of class actions, which
typically require the court to police class counsel's faithfulness (e.g.,
by more effectively identifying and rejecting settlements that appear
to be collusive).
The question regarding how best to address agency costs in
the class setting is reminiscent of an ongoing debate in the regulatory
compliance setting between proponents of "command-and-control"
or direct regulation (in which regulatory agencies establish not only
standards but, also, the means by which they will be achieved,
imposing penalties when the means are not adopted)1 36 and
proponents of market or incentive-based regulations (which, as the
name implies, typically hold out the promise of increased profits or
reduced costs to induce desired behavior).1 37 Attempts to align the
incentives of class counsel and the class members by reference to
class counsel's perceived interest in maximizing his profit are
analogous to incentive-based regulations. In their favor, such
regulations generally require less monitoring than command-andcontrol regulations. Incentive-based regulations also allow for more
flexibility by the regulated entity to develop its own processes for
meeting announced targets.'3 "Command-and-control" regulation is
loosely analogous to direct regulation by the courts of the adequacy
of class settlements, such as when class settlement evaluation
standards are imposed under Rule 23(e), discussed below (with the
rejection of a proposed settlement amounting to a penalty for failure
136. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 97 (1995) ("Command-and-control regulation is a
dominant part of American government in such areas as environmental protection
and occupational safety and health regulation. In the environmental context,
command-and-control approaches usually take the form of regulatory requirements
of the 'best available technology' . . . ."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with

Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1017 (1995) ("Rules that specify end-states are
common in modern regulation, in the form of 'command and control' regulation
that says exactly what people must do and how they must do it.").
137. See Malloy, Regulating by Incentives, supra note 67, at 531-32
(explaining that market-based regulations create an opportunity to comply with
specific obligations by offering the positive incentive of increased profits or
reduced costs).
138. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570, 622 (1997) ("The use of economic-incentive-based regulatory
tools can further loosen the grip of federal regulators and give broad scope to
private actors to determine how best to meet environmental goals.").
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to comply with counsel's obligations). In its favor, this approach to
regulation, in general, does not depend on incentives to be properly
formulated or calibrated; the regulated entity either complies or faces
the risk of a penalty. 13 9 To some extent, command-and-control and
incentive "regulation" in the class setting overlap. 14 0 For example, a
fee award could be characterized as direct regulation in a particular
class action if it penalizes plaintiffs' counsel in that case for having
agreed to a barely-adequate settlement; that same award, however,
may also affect the incentives of other lawyers prosecuting other
class actions if they monitor fee awards in class cases. Broadly
framed, the policy question is: do we trust the "market" or the
regulator (here, the court)? 4 1 In the class setting, the answer to this
question-assuming we want to emphasize one form of "regulation"
of class counsel over another-depends in part on the characteristics
of class action litigation and firms, highlighted in the preceding
sections of this Article. The more complete account of class counsel,
outlined above, provides a new basis on which to tentatively
formulate specific recommendations; reform measures are most
likely to succeed if they reflect and respond to current conditions and
139. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and 'Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Reforms, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1330-31 (1985) (concluding that while command-and-control
regulation may not be "efficient," more tailored approaches have not proved to be
as effective).
140. See Sunstein, Problems with Rules, supra note 136, at 1017 ("The line
between privately adaptable rules and commands is one of degree rather than one
of kind.").
141. To help mediate this debate, Professor Malloy has developed a
"resource-allocation" model that peers inside the firm to determine whether
command-and-control or incentive-based regulations are more likely to encourage
innovation by firms attempting to comply with environmental regulations. Malloy,
Regulating by Incentives, supra note 67, at 535-36. Building on the work of
organizational theorists and considering such factors as the role of employee
attention as a scarce resource to be allocated within a firm, id. at 556-58, the
subgoals (other than maximizing firm profit) communicated by the firm's formal
and informal operating procedures and by routines of individuals or subdivisions
within the firm, id. at 560-61, and the way firm structure (e.g., specialization of
tasks) affects the distribution of information within a firm, id. at 565, Professor
Malloy suggests that regulatory choice and application should be guided in part by
our understanding of the internal structure of firms, id at 604. I adopt this
proposal in this Article, below, without, however, relying upon the specific
technical language developed by Professor Malloy.
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practices.
1.

The New Model's Complexity May Enable
Tailoring of Incentive-Based Reforms
a.

Firm Structure Reveals New Levers to
Align Class Counsel's and Class
Members' Interests

To reduce agency costs, courts and commentators have
promoted reforms designed to more closely align the interests of
class counsel and class members, focusing on two moments in class
litigation: the appointment of class counsel (e.g., ensuring that subclasses with distinct interests are separately represented by class
counsel1 42 or conducting auctions 14 3 ) and the award of fees to
successful counsel (e.g., the methodology used to calculate fees). 144
The more complete account of class counsel outlined in this Article
presents at least the opportunity to better tailor these incentives.
142. In Amchem, confronting a mass tort settlement class involving asbestos
claims, the Supreme Court added its imprimatur to several years of efforts by
various lower courts to better define the limits of Rule 23, by describing the
(limited) relevance of settlement to the certification determination. 521 U.S. at
621 ("[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing
Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of
litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed."). In the process, the
Court also refashioned the adequacy of representation determination under Rule
23(a)(4), to focus more squarely on class counsel's economic interests. Id. at 626
(finding representation to be inadequate when presently-injured and exposure-only
settlement class members were lumped together in a single class). The Court took
a similar approach to assessing adequacy of representation by reference to class
counsel's perceived economic interests in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., another
proposed asbestos settlement class. 527 U.S. 815, 855-56 (1999) ("[E]ven
ostensible parity between settling nonclass plaintiffs and class members would be
insufficient to overcome the failure to provide the structural protection of
independent representation as for subclasses with conflicting interests," including
persons with present and future injury claims, who should have been divided into
separate subclasses "with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests
of counsel.").
143. See supra notes 31 and 35 (citing journal articles discussing the use of
auctions in class action cases).
144. See supra notes 31 and 36-37 (citing journal articles discussing
attorney fees in class action cases).
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Three examples illustrate approaches that could be explored in
reliance upon a more complete account of class counsel.
First-though, as noted, more data is needed to verify this
hypothesis-it is possible that the natural instinct of many MDL
judges to gravitate toward larger firms when selecting counsel for
leadership positions is more than mere bias. As discussed in Section
III, above, that strategy or preference may actually increase the
likelihood that lawyers working on those cases will feel less pressure
to make case-investment and settlement decisions driven
predominantly by their interest in maximizing their law firm's profit.
That preference could be converted into a presumption when courts
are selecting among firms competing for appointment as class
counsel.
Second, to refine the project of interest alignment and thus
reduce possible agency costs, courts could appoint individual
attorneys, rather than firms, and, moreover, could restrict the
appointed attorneys' opportunity to delegate case-management
authority within the firm. In the BP MDL, Judge Barbier did just
that.145 He effectively pierced the firm and required that it make
internal case staffing decisions in accordance with his dictates.146 A
more complete account of class counsel suggests that Judge
Barbier's instinct was correct. However, by disproportionately
145. See Case Mgmt. Order No. 8 at 2, In re Oil Spill, 747 F. Supp. 2d 704
available
at
http://www.mslitigation
(E.D.
La.
2010),
("The
review.com/uploads/file/MDL%20Steering%20committee%2order.pdf
appointment to the PSC and/or Executive Committee is of a personal nature.
Accordingly, the above appointees cannot be substituted by other attorneys,
including members of the appointee's law firm, to perform the PSC's exclusive
functions, such as committee meetings and court appearances, except with prior
approval of the Court.").
146. See Malloy, Regulating by Incentives, supra note 67, at 536 ("[W]hat
goes on inside the firm matters, and regulators should pay attention to this point in
designing and implementing regulation."); Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and
the Firm, supra note 68, at 460 ("Admittedly, the notion that regulators should
reach within the firm to purposefully and directly alter the management function
challenges the longstanding presumption in the compliance literature against such
intervention. Given, however, what we now know about the internal workings of
firms and other organizations, the time has come to revisit that presumption.
Research on bounded rationality, organizational inertia, and cognitive biases
demonstrates that firms and the individuals within them are much less efficient and
adaptive than is typically assumed.").
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appointing senior partners who presumably have greater equity
stakes in their firms, he may have exacerbated the agency cost
problems predicted by the conventional account of class counsel.
Cabining considerations like experience and skill (factors relevant to
appointment to a leadership position, but not necessarily relevant to
reducing agency costs), the "best" lawyer may be one who is likely
to be less identified with the firm in which he practices, and thus less
focused on maximizing its fees.
Third, when considering the effects of fees on lawyer
incentives, courts and commentators can, equipped with a more
complete account of plaintiffs' class counsel, be mindful of the ways
law firm internal structure may enhance or detract from expected
fees as an effective lever for aligning interests of class counsel and
the class. Is a particular fee award methodology likely to induce
plaintiffs' attorneys to make the "correct" investment in a particular
class action? The answer is that it depends, at least in part, on who is
running the case and on his particular relationship with his firm; it
also depends on the extent to which case value is capable of
reasonably precise estimation at the time case-investment decisions
are being made. In a large class action, where case value is
indeterminate and the lawyer making case-management decisions
does not perceive his own interests to appreciably turn on the fee
calculation methodology, the fee lever may not have the desired
effect.
b.

Why TailoredIncentives May Fail

There are a number of reasons to doubt the effectiveness of
tailored incentive-based efforts to better manage agency costs in
class actions. First, to the extent such reforms seek to control how
law firms allocate intra-firm case-management authority, they may
unduly invade law firm autonomy; after all, the law firm, as a whole,
presumably bears the costs of prosecuting litigation and should
arguably have the opportunity to influence the case-management
decisions made by individual attorneys (even if, as I argue above,
that rarely happens in practice). Moreover, case staffing changes
over time and is exceedingly difficult for a court to police. In short,
it is not clear that any one lawyer's incentives will or should shape
all case-investment and settlement decisions in each case.
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Second, complexity may provide more insight, but it does not
necessarily identify a more effective lever for reducing agency costs
by manipulating incentives. As noted, the factors suggesting an
absence of cohesion within a firm regarding the presumed goal of
maximizing firm profit do not necessarily suggest that the interests
of lawyer and clients are better aligned; instead, they may simply
diverge in ways the conventional account of class counsel does not
contemplate. A lawyer may over-invest or under-invest in litigation,
or pursue his own interests at the expense of the class, in any number
of ways unrelated to maximizing law firm profit.
Third, there are costs associated with too nuanced an
approach to either attorney selection or to fees, in terms of court
time, as well as errors. Courts will need to evaluate much more
information to select and pay counsel involved in litigation when
attempting to factor into their analysis the effects of law firm
structure on attorney incentives or on attorney sensitivity to feedriven incentives, in particular. To the extent courts attempt to direct
internal firm case staffing, courts may need to police the staffing of
class cases, a time-consuming and possibly futile task. Courts also
lack information about the way each attorney working on a case is
positioned within his law firm structure, something that changes over
time. For these reasons, courts are likely to make errors or likely to
resist this kind of micromanaging.
Finally, reducing agency costs is just one goal of court
intervention in both the selection and payment of class counsel; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(g), addressing selection of class counsel, considers
multiple factors-such as experience-which are not designed to
align interests, but are, instead, designed. to promote competent
Rule 23(h), authorizing a court to award
representation.147
"reasonable" attorney's fees in class actions, 14 8 requires courts to
consider factors-including the reaction of the class, or the "skill and
efficiency of the attorneys involved"-that, at best, only tangentially
relate to the project of reducing agency costs by better aligning the

147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A) (listing, among other factors to be
considered when a court selects class counsel, class counsel's "knowledge" and
"experience").
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
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interests of class counsel and the class.14 9 Those competing goals
may not be served by an undue focus on ex ante interest alignment.
2.

Complexity Counsels in Favor of
Rehabilitating the Trial Court Judge to
Minimize Agency Costs

How can we best address the problem of agency costs in
class litigation, such as it is? It may not be by constructing a better
hypothetical plaintiffs' class action attorney, ascribing to him limited
incentives, and then manipulating those incentives to ever-moreclosely align his presumed interests with those of the class members.
Because of the variety of incentives potentially influencing class
counsel's case-investment and settlement calculus, it is easy to rely
too heavily on market-based (interest alignment) approaches to
reducing agency costs. Instead, though commentators have generally
low opinions of the ability of judges to directly regulate class
counsel and weed out bad settlements,so the trial court judge149. See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1
(3d Cir. 2000) (listing factors to be considered by courts when determining a
"reasonable" fee in class cases).
150. See, e.g., Coffee, Accountability and Competition, supra note 2, at 413
(noting that the need for judicial approval of class settlements has had "only
marginal success at best" in reducing agency costs); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 805, 829 (1997) ("The same
problems that confront courts in the settlement context are present throughout class
action litigation. No matter how virtuous the judge, the fact remains that courts are
overworked, they have limited access to quality information, and they have an
overwhelming incentive to clear their docket. They cannot reliably police the dayto-day interests of absent class members."); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 324, 348-49 (providing a particularly nuanced analysis of the
trial court's ability to serve a gatekeeper function generally, and noting: "The
detail provided by amended Rule 23(e) does not alter the reality that judges
performing this task [of reviewing proposed class settlements] are doing a job
quite different from traditional adjudication . . . . Ultimately, what they must do is

become regulators, sensitive both to the dynamics of litigation activity and the
underlying concerns of the body of law that give rise to the claims asserted.");
Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing, supra note 32, at 1438 (arguing that the
fairness hearing deserves "more, not less, attention," and noting that some
commentators have "essentially given up on the judiciary's ability to provide real
class action oversight; indeed the [agency cost and collateral attack] literature is
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properly guided by better-articulated settlement evaluation standards
and by better evidence regarding case value-may be worth
rehabilitating. That is, direct regulation of class counsel, especially
at the final approval hearing stage of class litigation, may have a
greater role to play in the ongoing project of managing agency costs.
Courts currently assess the substantive fairness of proposed
class settlements by reference to criteria that are too loose to
properly weed out bad settlements, whether such settlements are
caused by misaligned interests not captured by the conventional
account of class counsel, or even, just by ineffective lawyering.15 1
The Second Circuit's test, articulated in City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp.152 in 1974, remains good law in that jurisdiction1 53 and is
typical. 154 The "Grinnell factors" include: (1) the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the
class to the class settlement notice; (3) the stage of the proceeding;
largely motivated by this failure. Market-focused scholars locate monitoring
outside of the judiciary and then rarely ponder what effect their proposals ought to
have on the fairness hearing that will inevitably take place; it appears implicit that
if the monitoring mechanism works, it does not really matter what the judge does
at the end of the show, so long as she simply lowers the curtain").
151. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, JudicialReview of Class
Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 168 (2009) ("Review of class action
settlements takes the form of a list of factors uncertain in scope, ambiguous in
meaning, and undefined in weight.").
152. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
153. Grinnell remains good law on the issue of the settlement approval
factors. The Second Circuit has retreated, however, from the position it staked out
in Grinnell favoring the lodestar approach on fees. See Goldberger v. Integrated
Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2000) (embracing percentage methodology
for calculating class action fees as an option).
154. See, e.g., Sullivan v. D.B. Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 319 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing as the doctrinal core of the settlement approval analysis the test articulated
by the Third Circuit in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1975)
(directing trial courts faced with proposed class action settlements to consider,
under Rule 23(e), when assessing the settlement's adequacy: "(1) The complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing
damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the
ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9)
the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of
all the attendant risks of litigation")).
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(4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing
damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through trial;
(7) the defendant's ability to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the
"range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best
possible recovery"; and (9) the "range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant
risks of litigation."' 5 5 These approval criteria are too vague in both
formulation and application. In formulation, the factors fail to
specifically identify the recurring settlement structures that generate
hostility to class aggregation. In application, the class settlement
final approval criteria deployed in most Circuits rely too heavily on
ex ante indicia of structural fairness to justify settling counsel's
determination of settlement value, presuming fairness, in many
jurisdictions, of class settlements "reached in arm's-length
negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful

discovery."

56

Patently unfair settlement structures can easily be identified,
and either presumptively disfavored-such that a much higher
showing would be needed in order to justify either preliminary or
CAFA already disfavors coupon
final approval-or barred.
settlements, though it seeks to curb abuse using market incentives by
requiring that the fee award in such settlements "shall be based on
the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed." 57
The Federal Judicial Center's MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
lists settlement red flags, though it does not suggest that judges
necessarily presume the inadequacy of settlements with these
provisions.
Another recent list of inappropriate settlement
155.
156.

City ofDetroit,495 F.2d at 463.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir.

2005) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

§ 30.42 (3d ed. 1995)). See

also In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004)
(reaffirming the Circuit's commitment to requiring a "presumption of fairness
when reviewing a proposed settlement where: '(1) the settlement negotiations
occurred at arm's length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents of
the settlement are experienced in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of
the class objected"' (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232 n.18
(3d Cir. 2001))).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).
158.

MANUAL

FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION,

supra note

78,

§ 22.923

(identifying as "things to avoid in mass tort settlement," among others: (1) treating
similarly situated persons differently, (2) splitting claims of class members via
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provisions comes from federal trial court Judge William Alsup, who,
in his "Notice Regarding Factors to Be Evaluated for Any Proposed
Class Settlement," which he has issued in a number of pending class
cases,159 expresses skepticism of specific settlement structures, like
overly-broad releases, 60 reversionary funds married to unduly
difficult claims programs,161 or, even, agreements between the
settling counsel as to class counsel's fees. 162 The point here is not
that Judge Alsup's list is perfect, but that it heads in the correct
direction: obviously-unfair settlement provisions can and should be
expressly identified and either barred or disfavored. Judge Alsup's
list of factors goes well beyond Rule 23(e)'s "fair, reasonable, and
adequate" standard for final approval, 163 and, also, is much more
specific than the multi-factor tests for settlement approval that have
been articulated by various appellate courts.
Judge Alsup's "Notice" provides useful guidance, too, on the
evidentiary support that could be required in every class action case
to establish the adequacy of a proposed settlement's value. Judge
Alsup suggests, specifically, that class counsel should prepare a
"final expert class damage report" as part of his "due diligence" on
behalf of the class, and, presumably, before settling the class

settlement, (3) disparate treatment of inventory or future-injury claims, (4) overlystrict eligibility criteria, and (5) restrictions on opt outs).
159. See, e.g., Thorns v. Officemax N. Am. Inc., No. C 11-02233 (N.D. Cal.
June 8, 2011), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/california/candce/3:2011 cv022331241512/13 (showing an example of Judge
Alsup's application of his "Notice Regarding Factors to Be Evaluated for Any
Proposed Class Settlement" to a pending case); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,
available at
2011),
21,
Mar.
Cal.
(N.D.
10-02067,
No. C
http://docsjustia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/califomia/candce/3:201 0cv0206
7/227577/84 (explaining factors Judge Alsup expects counsel to consider in
structuring class action settlements). All further references herein are to the
version of the Notice Judge Alsup issued in Xavier.
160. Xavier, No. C. 10-02067 at 2.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 3-4.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) was helpfully amended in 2003 to provide
direction to trial courts which earlier iterations of the Rule lacked. In addition, the
Committee Note to Rule 23 now provides additional useful guidance. However,
even the amended Rule 23 lacks the kind of specificity that could be considered as
part of the next step in guiding the exercise of trial court discretion with respect to
proposed class settlements.
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claims.164 Recognizing the limits of the project of interest alignment
as a way of ensuring fair settlements, courts could also insist upon
some acceptable method of non-binding sampling (for settlement
purposes), conducted by or before a competent neutral, to be
developed as a rough proxy for the value of the litigation, prior to
and as a basis of settlement discussions in damages class actions.165
Giving more precise content to what constitutes a fair and adequate
settlement, including the use of sampling or formulas to create a
comparison point for settlement value, may enhance the likelihood
that class action settlement values will more closely reflect case
value: in every case, there would at least be a fixed start for purposes
of assessing the adequacy of settlement amount, something that
current practices and doctrine do not create or require.166
Identification of the precise sampling procedures best able to
generate reliable figures for case value is a separate topic, in and of
* 167
itself, and one that has already been the subject of some inquiry.
164. Xavier, No. C. 10-02067 at 2.
165. MDL courts (to which related cases on file in the federal system are
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407) routinely use bellwether trials designed
for a similar purpose. See Eldon Fallon, et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2323, 2332-42 (2008) (describing the mechanics and
benefits of using the modem "informational approach" to bellwether trials, i.e.,
individual cases within the aggregate selected for trial because they involve
representative facts, claims or defenses). However, the use of bellwether trials or
of other sampling methods is not currently required to justify settlement value in
aggregate litigation.
166. Settling parties who wish to deviate from case value by settlement
could be required to justify any such variance. For example, sampling variability,
the parties' risk preferences, and litigation transaction costs could all justify some
level of deviation from the values produced by whatever formula is ultimately
employed to assess case value.
167. See, e.g., Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice
of Law Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 374, 378 (2011) ("Our principal contribution is a basic,
straightforward point: the average of the differing state laws is, as a practical
matter, the actual law that governs the choice a business will make. It expresses
the choice that the multiple states involved expect, and presumably want, a
business to make regarding whether and how safely it should engage in activities
involving interstate risk."); see also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice
Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial of
Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815,.839 (1992) ("We already have noted one flaw
in the imagery of the archetypal civil trial: The verdict appears precise and
individualized, but in reality it is only a sample of one from a wider population of
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The rough contours of possible sampling procedures can easily be
imagined; "settlement by formula" would at most require the
universal application of current best practices, rather than the
invention of wholly new procedures.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court,
confronting an expansive Title VII gender discrimination class
asserting pay and promotion claims, rejected the use of statistical
sampling in lieu of additional individual proceedings to calculate the
amount of any back pay owed to class members asserting pattern-orpractice claims.' 6 8 The Ninth Circuit, addressing manageability and
due process concerns, had suggested that the Dukes trial court could
determine a back pay award using procedures analogous to those
approved by the Ninth Circuit in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,169 a class
action involving approximately 10,000 victims of torture and other
abuse, where the court appointed a special master under Federal Rule
of Evidence 706 to select a statistically valid sampling of claims for
purposes of calculating aggregate damages.1 70 The Supreme Court
in Dukes characterized that approach as "Trial by Formula," and
rejected it as a violation of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b).1 7 1 Other courts, faced with similar proposals in different
substantive law settings, have rejected the use of statistical sampling
to prove and allocate class damages (often called "fluid recovery")
on Constitutional grounds, as a violation of defendants' Due Process

rights.172
possible outcomes. The illusion that individualized adjudication provides a
precision that aggregation lacks is nothing more than that, an illusion."); Byron G.
Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80
TEMP. L. REv. 1013, 1044-51 (2007) (surveying legal commentary on the use of
statistical sampling in mass torts).
168. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545-46 (2011).
169. 103 F.3d 767, 782-87 (9th Cir. 1996).
170. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625-26 (9th Cir. 2010).
171. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (stating that the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b), provides that federal rules of procedure cannot be used to
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right").
172. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231-32 (2d
Cir. 2008) (rejecting use of statistical sampling and averaging to both calculate and
allocate aggregate class damages as a violation of the Rules Enabling Act and of
defendants' due process rights: "When fluid recovery is used to permit the mass
aggregation of claims, the right of defendants to challenge the allegations of
individual plaintiffs is lost, resulting in a due process violation").
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None of these doctrinal concerns impedes "settlement by
formula," i.e., the use of statistical sampling to connect settlement
and case value. Requiring specific evidence as a condition of
approval of proposed class settlements neither violates the Rules
Enabling Act, nor poses a threat to any party's Constitutional rights.
It does, however, squarely address one of the most troubling
difficulties with regard to the evaluation of any class settlement, i.e.,
the relative indeterminacy of case value. The exact content of a
valuation process could be tailored to the size and nature of a case or
category of litigation. The only real requirement is that the valuation
method be reliable. For example, settlement by formula could
involve the use of court-appointed experts to sample and value
claims, as the trial court did in Hilao," or bellwether trials 74 of a
statistically valid sampling of relevant categories of individual
claims, or the adjudication of a sampling of representative claims
before a neutral arbitrator. While any procedure would be subject to
strategic behavior by settling parties, trial courts would at least have
a target category of evidence on which to insist, the quality of which
the courts could regulate.
Settlement by formula sets a benchmark for case value
against which any settlement can be compared, and thus takes
pressure off of ex ante structural interest-alignment or market-based
approaches to ensuring fair process and outcomes. A properly
conducted sampling would also address allocation issues within
settlement classes, taking pressure off of courts concerned about
conflicts within classes, under Rule 23(a)(4) or 23(g). Requiring this
kind of procedure could also have ancillary benefits, such as
reducing the effectiveness of reverse auctionsl 7 5 among competing
groups of plaintiffs' counsel. In addition, the requirement of specific
kinds of proof of case value would enable legitimate (nonprofessional) objectors to more meaningfully participate in the
settlement evaluation process; currently, settlement value is one of
173. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
175. See Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1099
(9th Cir. 2008) ("A reverse auction is said to occur when 'the defendant in a series
of class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a settlement
with in the hope that the district court will approve a weak settlement that will
preclude other claims against the defendant."' (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial
Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002))).

Symposium 2012]

CLASS ACTION ATTORNEYS

83 1

the hardest things for a class member to assess, or for a potential
objector to criticize, because it is so difficult to ascertain, and
because case value, at the moment, tends to be deemed to be
whatever the settling parties say it is, after arm's-length negotiation.
This notion results from the widespread use of a presumption of
fairness, one which should be abandoned in favor of a more rigorous
inquiry regarding the fairness of class settlements.
By giving specific, clear content to the approval criteria for
class settlements, in the form of specifically-enumerated disfavored
settlement terms, and by reducing uncertainty at the settlement
evaluation stage regarding case value, we can better equip the trial
court to facilitate class action settlements that are truly fair and
adequate without placing undue emphasis on whether, in any given
case, class counsel's and class members' interests may or may not
have been formally aligned.
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